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ABSTRACT 
Theoretical and empirical evidence debates on whether acquirers can exploit their 
overvalued equity and create value by purchasing less overvalued or undervalued target 
firms. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Savor and Lu (2009) argue in favor of this, while Fu et 
al. (2013) and Akbulut (2013) provide evidence against. We revisit this issue and develop a 
quasi-experimental design. The misvaluation effect for stock acquirers that are more 
overvalued than their targets is isolated and measured. Our findings offer direct evidence in 
favor of the Shleifer and Vishny (2003) market timing hypothesis. 
 
 
Keywords: Relative misvaluation, stock, cash, difference-in-differences, Mahalanobis 
matching 
JEL classification: G14, G30, G34 
 
 
                                                          
*
 Corresponding Author: Evangelos Vagenas-Nanos, Address: Adam Smith Business School, Accounting and 
Finance, West Quadrangle, Main Building, Room 359A, University of Glasgow, University Avenue, Glasgow, 
G12 8QQ, Telephone number: +44 (0)141 330 7677, email address: evangelos.vagenas-nanos@glasgow.ac.uk 
  
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
One of the theoretical predictions of Shleifer and Vishny’s (2003) model argues that 
overvalued acquirers that purchase less overvalued or undervalued target firms by offering 
their overvalued equity as a means of financing serve the interests of their long-term 
shareholders. However, there is an ongoing debate in empirical literature on whether long-
term shareholders of overvalued stock acquirers benefit from takeover activity. Savor and 
Lu (2009) argue in favor of Shleifer and Vishny’s (2003) prediction. They compare the long-
run performance of stock acquisitions with that of withdrawn stock deals. They show that 
withdrawn deals earn lower long-run abnormal returns than completed deals, indicating 
that shareholders of acquirers are better off with rather than without the acquisition. In 
contrast to this evidence, Fu et al. (2013) and Akbulut (2013) argue against the benefits of 
overvalued equity being exploited in an M&As framework. Fu et al. (2013) show that 
overvalued stock acquirers underperform overvalued non-acquirers in the long-run. 
Given the debate and contradictory findings in the empirical finance literature, we 
revisit the research question of whether shareholders of acquirers benefit when employing 
their overvalued equity in acquiring target firms. We develop a research framework that 
more accurately and precisely isolates and measures the impact of overvaluation for stock 
acquirers. We further explain and discuss why the research frameworks of Fu et al. (2013) 
and Akbulut (2013) are underspecified and are not informative to draw conclusions in 
favour or against the market timing hypothesis of Shleifer and Vishny (2003). In Fu et al. 
(2013) and Akbulut’s (2013) work, it is not clear whether the underperformance of 
overvalued stock acquirers is driven by the acquisitions effect, by the methods of payment 
or by the overvaluation effect. Hence, their approach is not suitable to offer evidence in 
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favour or against the Shleifer and Vishny’s (2003) misvaluation hypothesis. Unlike, Fu et al. 
(2013) and Akbulut (2013), the design of our approach contributes into accounting for all 
forces that acquirers’ share price is subject to and successfully isolates the effect emanating 
from offering overvalued equity. The long-run performance of overvalued stock acquirers is 
subject to four different forces: the misevaluation effect and three additional ones. The first 
one is a natural long-run stock price correction (Daniel et al., 1998; De Bondt and Thaler, 
1985). Overvalued firms have the most incentive to proceed to acquisitions using stock as a 
means of financing the deal. A long-term downward effect is expected due to overvaluation 
and a stock price reversal. The second effect is a negative signaling effect. Myers and Majluf 
(1994) and Travlos (1987) argue that equity issuance signals negative news to the market, as 
investors realize that such an announcement implies that the firm is likely to be overvalued, 
resulting in a negative market reaction.1 The third force is the acquisition effect itself. 
Empirical evidence argues that acquisitions destroy value (Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Rau and 
Vermaelen, 1998) in the long-run. The comparison of acquirers with non-acquirers (as in Fu 
et al., 2013 and Akbulut, 2013) does not take this effect into account. Finally, the fourth 
force is the effect of the exploitation of overvalued equity. If Shleifer and Vishny’s (2003) 
story holds, this is expected to have a positive effect. Conclusively, overvalued stock 
acquirers are subject to three potentially negative forces (i.e signaling, long-run price 
correction, acquisition effect) and one possibly positive force (i.e. exploitation of overvalued 
                                                          
1
 One may argue that signalling is a short-run effect. Nevertheless, announcements of takeover deals convey 
important news to the market and long-run price reactions are observed. Had it not had any long-run effects, 
there should be no difference in cash and stock payment deals in the long –run which is not the case (Rau and 
Vermaelen, 1998). Markets are not always efficient. Even in more obvious cases, such as earnings 
announcements, a well document longer run drift is observed. If markets were strong form efficient, the signal 
and the news conveyed upon the announcement of earnings would have been incorporated in share price 
immediately. Empirical evidence indicates that a long-run drift appears after the announcement day (Bernard 
and Thomas, 1990). Similarly, in the case of takeovers, the announcement of deals has longer term signaling 
implications. 
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equity). The aim of this paper is to eliminate the first three forces and isolate and measure 
the effect of exploiting overvalued equity in an M&As framework. 
We study US listed acquirers that announce completed acquisitions of listed target 
firms in the period 1985 to 2016. Our sample includes deals that are financed either with 
100% equity or 100% cash. We adopt Rhodes-Kropf et al.’s (2005) decomposing 
methodology in order to identify overvalued and undervalued acquiring and target firms. 
Takeovers for which the acquirer is more overvalued than the target firm are classified as 
high relative misvaluation (high RM) deals, and all other deals are classified as low relative 
misvaluation (low RM) deals. We develop a quasi-experimental design and a difference-in-
differences approach in an attempt to isolate, capture and measure the effect emanating 
from the exploitation of overvaluation in stock acquisitions. At the first stage, we compare 
the long-run performance of high RM stock deals with that of low RM stock deals. This first 
difference between the two groups captures misvaluation related effects by employing 
stock as a method of payment and non-valuation related effects. If Shleifer and Vishny’s 
(2003) hypothesis holds, there should be a positive effect for high RM deals and a neutral or 
negative effect for low RM deals. The non-valuation related effects are mainly associated 
with a natural long-run price correction. High RM deals are subject to a downward price 
correction while low RM ones are subject to an upward price correction. The second 
difference is estimated between high RM and low RM cash deals. This difference captures 
only non-valuation related effects. Cash acquirers, irrespective of their relative misvaluation, 
are not associated with any exploitation of misvaluation benefits. Hence, the difference in 
performance of Cash High RM versus Low RM deals captures only the long-run price 
correction for the two groups. The difference of the two differences [(Stock high RM - Stock 
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low RM) - (Cash high RM - Cash low RM)] cancels out the non-valuation related effects and 
generates only the valuation effect as exploited by stock acquirers. Our difference-in-
differences (dif-in-difs) estimator indicates a positive effect of around 15%-28% for a period 
of two to five years post acquisition announcement for firms that exploited overvaluation by 
undertaking stock acquisitions. 
The signaling effect does not bias the difference-in-differences estimator. If stock 
deals convey a negative signal (Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Travlos, 1987), both high and low 
RM stock deals will be subject to downward pressure. Hence, the first difference between 
high and low RM stock acquisitions will remain unaffected. The same holds for the second 
difference between cash takeovers. If cash acquisitions signal neutral or positive news, both 
cash subsamples will be affected but the difference between them will remain unaffected. 
We take the assumption that the signaling effect will be equal for both high and low RM 
subsamples.2 Overvalued cash acquirers may benefit by acquiring undervalued target firms. 
However, that happens because of the exploitation of target undervaluation not 
exploitation of their misevaluation and that does not affect our research framework. 
On average, takeover deals have been shown to destroy market value in the long-
run. The acquisition effect is also unlikely to bias the difference-in-differences estimator. We 
compare acquirers with acquirers. We do not compare acquirers with non-acquirers 
(Akbulut, 2013; Fu et al., 2013) or acquirers with failed acquirers (Savor and Lu, 2009). The 
long-term creation or destruction of synergies should on average be captured in all four 
subgroups. Even if we assume that overvaluation could incorporate elements of superior 
                                                          
2
 Even if we relax this assumption and accept that the negative signaling effect will be stronger for overvalued 
stock acquisitions, the first difference between high and low RM stock acquirers will be lower than estimated, 
leading to an underestimation of the dif-in-difs estimator. That would still work in favour of our findings and 
conclusions. 
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managerial skills (Tobin’s Q theory), the difference between high and low RM will be 
affected in favor of high RM deals. However, that would hold for the differences in both 
stock and cash subsamples, and the difference-in-differences estimator will remain 
unaffected. Malmendier and Tate (2008) argue that overconfident managers who destroy 
value for their shareholders are more likely to use cash as a method of payment. If we 
assume that cash acquirers are more likely to choose acquisitions of lower quality, both high 
and low RM cash acquirers will be subject to this effect. However, the second difference 
between high and low RM cash deals will remain unaffected and therefore the difference-
in-differences estimator is unlikely to be biased. Fishman (1989) argues that the medium of 
exchange may have valuation implication for the target firm. To account for the above 
acquisitions related effects, we run robustness test for premiums and operating 
performance. Our analysis shows that synergy gains or overpayment is unlikely to affect the 
dif-in-difs estimator. 
A major question in the difference-in-differences research framework is whether the 
two groups, stock and cash acquirers, are comparable. For instance, stock acquirers are 
shown to be more overvalued than cash acquirers (Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005). The 
descriptive statistics on misvaluation in our sample are consistent with this finding. The 
long-run price correction effect (the non-valuation related effect in the dif-in-difs approach) 
will be more pronounced for stock acquirers. To alleviate this issue, we adopt the minimum 
Mahalanobis distance matching technique (De Maesschalck et al., 2000). We match high RM 
stock acquirers with cash acquirers on the basis of the relative misvaluation measure as well 
as on an acquirer’s misvaluation measure. We repeat the same process for low RM stock 
acquirers. In this way, high (low) RM cash acquirers are equally overvalued (undervalued) 
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with high RM stock acquirers. The reversal effect should now be equal for both stock and 
cash acquirers, leading to an even more unbiased dif-in-difs estimator. We further extend 
the Mahalanobis distance matching technique by taking into consideration a number of 
additional observable variables that could have affected the choice of the method of 
payment. Our results remain robust in favor of the hypothesis that overvaluation has 
positive effects for the shareholders of stock acquirers. 
As a robustness check, we intensify the measure of relative misvaluation. We re-
classify high RM deals as the ones for which the positive side of the RM measure is above 
the median or belongs in the top quartile. As the measure of relative misvaluation is 
intensified, the dif-in-difs estimator becomes even more positive and significant. We further 
control whether overvalued stock acquirers pay lower premiums and whether that could 
drive the positive dif-in-difs estimator, but this is unlikely to be the case. Finally, we control 
whether overvalued stock acquirers choose better quality deals. We provide evidence that 
synergistic gains do not impact on the positive dif-in-difs estimator. 
Our paper draws different conclusions from Fu et al. (2013) and Akbulut (2013). Fu 
et al.’s (2013) study recognizes that the long-run performance of overvalued acquirers may 
be driven by a combination of an acquisitions related effect, such as a lack of synergy 
creation or overpayment, or a natural long-run price correction. To overcome these issues, 
they examine premiums paid to target firms. They report that overvalued stock acquirers 
pay higher premiums for their target firms as compared to non-overvalued stock acquirers. 
The main question is whether the overpayment of overvalued stock acquirers is due to 
acquirers’ overvaluation or to the fact that acquirers pay in equity. In other words, had 
overvalued acquirers used cash as a method of payment, would they not have paid higher 
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premiums? Is overpayment attributed to the method of payment or overvaluation? In 
addition, in order to evaluate synergies, Fu et al. (2013) examine the operating performance 
of overvalued acquirers. Their findings suggest that overvalued bidders exhibit worse 
operating performance than non-overvalued stock acquirers. The question remains the 
same. Is the worse operating performance driven by overvaluation or the method of 
payment? What would have been the difference in operating performance between 
overvalued and non-overvalued acquirers, had they employed cash in the takeover process? 
Their findings also suggest that overvalued acquirers underperform as compared to 
overvalued non-acquirers. Although they control for overvaluation in the two subsamples, 
the effects that are captured are mixed. The question is whether stock performance is 
driven i) by the fact that the acquirer pays in equity, ii) because of the acquisition effect or 
iii) because of a signaling effect. It is well established in the academic literature that 
acquirers underperform as compared to non-acquirers (Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Rau and 
Vermaelen, 1998). Akbulut (2013) reports similar results to Fu et al. (2013). He finds that the 
long-term performance of overvalued stock acquirers is lower than that of overvalued non-
acquirers. The question remains the same: Is the difference in stock price performance 
driven by the method of payment i.e. stock (signaling) or by the acquisitions effect? The 
difference of the two subsamples is likely to be driven by a mix of different forces and it is 
appropriate to provide fruitful and direct conclusions to Shleifer and Vishny’s (2003) 
hypothesis. Both Fu et al. (2013) and Akbulut (2013) mainly refer to and examine overvalued 
acquirers rather than the clear effect of the exploitation of overvaluation of equity in 
takeover deals, as our study does.  
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On the other hand, our findings are consistent with Savor and Lu (2009). Savor and 
Lu (2009) examine a small sample of acquisitions that were initially announced but at a later 
stage withdrawn for exogenous reasons. They find that stock acquisitions outperform stock 
failed deals, implying that the long-term shareholders of stock acquirers are better off with 
rather than without the acquisition. The obvious question again is related to the method of 
payment. Is the performance difference driven by the method of payment, i.e. financing the 
deal with equity, or by other factors? Savor and Lu (2009) show that this relationship holds 
for stock but not for cash acquisitions. Their findings provide evidence in favor of Shleifer 
and Vishny’s (2003) market timing hypothesis. However, Savor and Lu (2009) do not account 
for overvaluation. They assume that all stock acquisitions are driven by a misvaluation 
difference, while this is not the case. Our findings indicate that a proportion of stock-
financed takeovers are not driven by overvaluation. Either the acquirer is not overvalued or 
the acquirer is less overvalued or more undervalued than the target firm. The sample of 
failed acquisitions is relatively small. While they provide evidence in favor of overvalued 
stock acquirers, our difference-in-differences approach more accurately captures and 
measures the benefits to long-term stock acquirers. 
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we propose a 
difference-in-differences approach which disentangles, captures and measures the effects 
emanating from the exploitation of overvaluation in stock acquisitions. Second, we provide 
answers on the reasons of the debate in the literature. Fu et al. (2013) and Akbulut (2013) 
reach different conclusions simply because they do not account for various effects, such as 
signaling or the acquisition effect related to overvalued stock acquirers. Our research 
framework shows that the negative long-run performance of overvalued stock acquirers is 
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mainly driven by a signaling and a stock price reversal effect, while the exploitation of 
overvalued equity contributes positively and serves as a form of resistance to downward 
price pressures. Third, we provide direct evidence in support of Shleifer and Vishny’s (2003) 
market timing theory. We find that there are positive market timing effects for overvalued 
stock acquirers. The negative performance of stock acquirers can be attributed to effects 
other than the exploitation of overvalued equity. 
Our work is closely related to the studies of Akbulut (2013), Ben-David et al. (2014) 
and Fu et al. (2013). Unlike these studies, which investigate the behaviour of overvalued 
stock acquirers and capture a combination of effects, we disentangle and measure the 
effect related to the exploitation of overvalued equity only. This study also relates to the 
study of Savor and Lu (2009). While they also offer positive evidence in favor of the market 
timing hypothesis, our study more accurately captures this effect. From an empirical point 
of view, our work offers answers to the theoretical predictions of Shleifer and Vishny (2003) 
and addresses the debate and conflicting evidence around the market timing hypothesis. 
Finally, this paper fits with the studies of Myers and Majluf (1984) and Travlos (1987), and 
even more closely with Golubov et al. (2015). Our results indicate that despite the positive 
effects of exploiting overvalued equity, the informational content of stock acquisitions and 
the news signalled to the market is a strong determinant of the final effects of the 
shareholder wealth of stock acquirers. Golubov et al. (2015) disentangle the informational 
content and the acquisition effect of stock acquirers in order to understand the short-run 
market reaction upon the announcement of these acquisitions. They conclude that stock 
takeovers are not value destroying projects net the signaling effect. In this paper, we 
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disentangle four effects in order to be able to draw fruitful conclusions with regards to the 
effects of exploiting overvalued stock in an M&As framework. 
 
  2. Sample 
Our sample consists of US takeovers announced between January 1, 1985, and 
December 31, 2016. Takeover deals were collected from Thomson Security Data 
Corporations (SDC). For a deal to be included in our sample, it needs to meet the following 
criteria: 
o Both the acquirer and the target firm are US listed firms. 
o The acquiring firm purchases at least 50% of the shares of the target firm. 
o The deal value is at least $10 million. 
o The deal value represents at least 1% of the acquirers’ market value of 
equity. 
o The acquisition is financed by either 100% stock or 100% cash. 
o Both the acquiring and target firms have positive book values of assets the 
year before the announcement of the deal. 
 
The final sample consists of 2,352 takeover deals, out of which 1,546 are fully equity 
financed and 896 are cash-financed deals. Table 1 reports the number of deals per year and 
by the method of payment employed. Our results are consistent with prior evidence. There 
is an increase in takeover deals in the period 1997-2001, when the so-called dotcom bubble 
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occurred. This period is characterized as one of the largest merger waves in the history of 
M&As. Cash-financed acquisitions are mostly observed in the ‘80s, during the 1998-99 
merger wave, while when markets are highly overvalued, many more equity-financed 
acquisitions take place. A small merger wave is observed in 2006-2007. This is a period of 
higher liquidity and low interest rates in the markets, and as a result more cash acquisitions 
take place. After 2001, we observe a decline in stock deals which is in line with deBodt et al. 
(2015). 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
3. Measuring Acquirer and Target Relative Misvaluation 
One of the major requirements of our research set-up is to identify stock acquirers 
motivated by overvaluation. According to Shleifer and Vishny (2003), a necessary condition 
for acquirers to exploit their stock is that target firms need to be less overvalued or more 
undervalued than acquirers. 
To identify acquirers’ and targets’ misvaluation, we employ Rhodes-Kropf et al.’s 
(2005) methodology in decomposing a firm’s market-to-book value ratio into two 
components: the market-to-value and the value-to-book component: 
  (
 
 
)    (
 
 
)      
 
 
   (1) 
Where M is the market value of equity, B is the book value of equity and V is the true 
value of equity. While market and book value can be directly observed from the company’s 
statements, the intrinsic value (V) is unobservable. The intrinsic value (V) can be calculated 
as a linear function of book value of equity, net income and leverage.3 In order to capture 
                                                          
3
 Further details on the decomposing process and the estimation of the intrinsic value can be found in Rhodes-
Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan’s (2005) paper. A neat and simple description of this methodology can also 
be found in the Appendix of Fu et al. (2013). We closely follow this approach. 
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variation in investment opportunities across industries and over time, the parameters of the 
linear function are allowed to vary across industries and over time. The function is described 
as follows: 
  (    )                 (    )          (|     |)         
   (|     |)        (
 
    
)       (2) 
Where       is the Net Income of firm I at time t,  
  is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of one for firm-years with negative net income and zero otherwise. 
 
    
 is the 
leverage ratio for firm I at time t. Subscript j denotes the various industries. The variation of 
the market value that cannot be explained by the above factors is captured in the error term 
and acts a natural component of misevaluation. 
We then run cross-sectional regressions of Equation (2) for each year to estimate the 
      parameters for each industry according to Fama and French (1997) industry 
classification. The explanatory power of equation (2) is high with R squares above 80%. 
Following Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) approach, the long-run alpha parameters are estimates 
as   ̅  
 
 
∑  ̂    . The final measure of misevaluation is the following: 
  (
 
 
)    (    )       ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅      ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  (    )      ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  (|     |)      ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
   (|     |)      ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ ((
 
 
)
   
)  (3) 
The component of interest for our study is the    
 
 
 , which captures misvaluation. 
It denotes the market’s perception of the value of the company over the true value of the 
company. Higher values of the    
 
 
 ratio would indicate higher overvaluation. The Rhodes-
Kropf et al. (2005) decomposition methodology has been predominantly used in the 
literature (Fu et al., 2013; Elliot et al., 2008; DeAngelo et al., 2010, Eckbo et al., 2017). 
Table 2 presents the different ratios that compose the Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) 
decomposition formula, 42 days and 1 day before the announcement date. We follow Fu et 
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al. (2013) and compute misvaluation measures 42 days before the acquisition 
announcement in order to avoid market anticipation and information leakage effects. 
Especially for target firms, about a month prior to the announcement of a takeover, a high 
price run-up has been observed (Schwert, 1996). The market-to-value ratio for bidders as 
estimated 42 days prior to the acquisition announcement is higher than that of their targets, 
indicating that acquiring firms are more overvalued than their targets. Stock bidders appear 
to be more overvalued compared to cash bidders (0.704 versus 0.462). Although stock 
targets also appear to be overvalued, they are less overvalued than their bidding firms 
(0.112 versus 0.704). Closer to the announcement date (one day prior to the announcement 
date), target firms’ overvaluation increases, which depicts an increase in their market value 
driven by the expected price run-ups prior to the announcement. The market-to-book value 
ratio depicts similar evidence. Acquirers are more overvalued than targets, stock acquirers 
are more overvalued than cash acquirers and stock acquirers are more overvalued than 
stock targets. The above findings are consistent with the existing empirical literature 
(Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005; Fu et al., 2013; Akbulut, 2013; Ang and Cheng, 2006), confirm 
prior findings and suggest that our approach and estimations are consistent with existing 
evidence. While there is a consensus in the literature with respect to these facts, there is 
debate on whether shareholders of overvalued stock acquirers benefit from misvaluation 
differences between acquiring and target firms. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
According to the theoretical prediction of Shleifer and Vishny (2003), a bidder would 
benefit from relative misvaluations if it acquires an undervalued or less overvalued target 
firm. Even a fairly valued bidder that acquires an undervalued target firm should 
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theoretically benefit if the transaction is financed with equity. Therefore, what is important 
for our research framework is not the actual misvaluation of the acquirer and the target but 
their relative misvaluations. To capture this effect, we construct a relative misvaluation 
measure (RM) which captures the difference between the bidder’s and target’s 
misvaluation: 
      (
 
 
)
      
   (
 
 
)
      
  (4) 
Where RM is the relative misvaluation of a takeover,   (
 
 
)
      
 is the bidder’s 
misvaluation and   (
 
 
)
      
 is the target’s misvaluation 42 days before the acquisition 
announcement.4 We identify three groups of acquisitions. Deals for which the relative 
misvaluation is much higher than zero indicate that the acquirer is more overvalued or less 
undervalued than the target, and an acquirer could theoretically benefit by employing 
equity as a method of payment. Deals for which the relative misvaluation is zero (or close to 
zero) indicate that the acquirer is equally misvalued (or fairly valued) as the target and no 
relative misvaluation effects can be exploited. Finally, deals for which the relative 
misvaluation is much lower than zero indicate that the acquirer is less overvalued or more 
undervalued than the target firm and, theoretically, negative effects are generated by 
purchasing target firms using equity as a method of payment. 
For our analysis, we split takeovers into two groups: those that could theoretically 
benefit and those that would not benefit from relative misvaluations. Takeovers for which 
the relative misvaluation measure (RM) is higher than the first quartile of the positive values 
of RM are classified as high RM deals. These are deals in which a stock bidder could 
                                                          
4
 Our results are robust if we employ bidder’s and target’s misvaluation one day before the acquisition 
announcement. 
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theoretically take advantage of relative misvaluation. Takeovers for which the relative 
misvaluation measure (RM) belongs in the bottom quartile of the positive values of RM5 or 
is negative are classified as low RM deals. These are deals in which a stock bidder could not 
take advantage of relative misvaluations. 
The descriptive statistics of our sample indicate that almost 38% of stock acquisitions 
classified as low RM are not motivated by misvaluation. Fu et al. (2013) take a stricter 
approach in the classification of relative misvaluation and report similar results. 31% of their 
stock sample is not motivated by misvaluation. Savor and Lu (2009) do not account for this 
fact in their analysis. They assume that all stock acquisitions are motivated by bidders’ 
overvaluation. 
 
 
4. The Impact of Exploiting Overvaluation – A Difference-in-Differences Framework 
Examining the effects associated with overvalued stock acquirers is a complicated 
task. By simply estimating a long-run performance measure for acquirers that are 
overvalued and finance their deals by equity, we would not be able to draw fruitful 
conclusions about the quality of the acquisition or whether employing overvalued equity in 
the acquisition process has positive, neutral or negative effects for the shareholders of the 
bidding firm. The fundamental reason for that lies in the fact that the share price 
performance of overvalued stock acquirers is subject to four different forces. The main 
                                                          
5
 Takeovers for which the relative misvaluation measure (RM) belongs in the bottom quartile of the positive 
values of RM or in the top quartile of the negative values of RM are perceived to be deals for which the 
relative misvalution is close to zero, i.e. the bidder’s and target’s misvaluation is more or less similar. Our 
results remain robust even if we classify deals as high (low) RM if the RM is higher (lower) than zero. We take 
this approach in order to have a slightly larger sample of low RM deals and more meaningful statistical tests. 
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focus of this paper is to disentangle these effects and isolate and measure the effect of 
exploiting overvalued equity in takeover deals. 
First, overvalued acquirers are subject to a natural long-run price correction. There 
are periods when firms may be misvalued for some time, but in the longer run, the market 
will drive prices down to fundamentals (Daniel et al., 1998; De Bondt and Thaler, 1985). A 
long-run reversal is expected and will have a negative impact on the share price of 
overvalued acquirers. Second, the share price performance of stock acquirers will also be 
negatively affected by a signaling effect. Issuing equity in order to pay the shareholders of 
the target firm conveys negative news to the market about the valuation of the firm (Myers 
and Majluf, 1994; Travlos, 1987). Signaling is important in the M&A process. Golubov et al. 
(2015) show that stock acquisitions are not value-destructive projects if the signaling effect 
emanating from the method of payment is isolated. Signaling has long-term implications for 
the share price of acquirers. Studies (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998) find that long-run 
performance differences between cash and stock acquisitions.   Third, the share-price 
performance of acquirers is influenced by the quality of the acquisition itself. To measure 
the quality of the takeover, we refer to the combination of synergies to be created and the 
amount paid to the shareholders of the target firm. If the acquirer pays less (more) than the 
sum of the value of the target firm and synergies to be created, the market should perceive 
the deal favorably (less favorably). Empirical evidence on M&As (Loughran and Vijh, 1997; 
Rau and Vermaelen, 1998) shows that, on average, acquirers destroy value for their 
shareholders. The fourth effect that impacts the long-run performance of overvalued stock 
acquirers is the exploitation of their overvalued equity, if Shleifer and Vishny’s (2003) 
predictions hold. 
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Calculating the long-run performance of acquirers that exploit relative misvaluations 
and purchase less overvalued or more undervalued target firms by paying in equity is a 
combination of the four forces described above. In order to isolate, capture and measure 
the effect of the exploitation of relative misvaluation for acquirers that use equity as a 
method of payment in the takeover process, we develop a difference-in-differences 
research framework. The first difference represents the long-run share price performance 
between High and Low relative misvaluation stock acquirers. This difference captures 
misvaluation related effects and non-valuation related effects. If Shleifer and Vishny’s 
(2003) theoretical predictions hold, high RM stock acquirers are positively affected by 
exploiting their equity, while for low RM stock acquirers there is either a neutral or negative 
effect. The non-valuation related effects are mainly associated with a natural long-run price 
correction for overvalued and undervalued acquirers. High RM deals are subject to a 
downward price correction while Low RM deals are subject to an upward price correction. 
The second difference is calculated between high RM and low RM cash deals. This difference 
captures only non-valuation related effects. Cash acquirers, irrespective of their relative 
misvaluation, are not associated with any exploitation or lack of misvaluation benefits. 
Hence, the difference in the performance of high and low RM cash deals captures only the 
long-run price correction for the two groups. The difference of the two differences [(high 
RM Stock - Low RM Stock) - (high RM Cash - Low RM Cash)] cancels out the non-valuation 
related effects and generates only the valuation effect as exploited by stock acquirers. 
Figure 1 depicts the difference-in-differences research framework. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
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We compute the long-run performance of acquirers by estimating market-adjusted 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns6: 
            ∏ (      )
 
    ∏         
 
     (5) 
where             is the buy-and-hold abnormal returns for acquirer i from time 
t=0, which is the month of the acquisition announcement, to month T. T is the holding 
period,      is the monthly return for acquirer i in month t and      is the Datastream value-
weighted market index for the US market. 
Table 3 presents BHARs for 12, 24, 36 and 60 months following the announcement of 
the acquisition. The difference between high and low RM stock acquisitions is positive and 
significant for the holding periods of 12, 24 and 36 months. High RM stock acquirers are 
subject to a downward pressure due to their overvaluation and to a positive effect due to 
the exploitation of overvaluation, while low RM stock acquirers exhibit an upward price 
correction due to their undervaluation and a neutral or negative effect due to the fact that 
they do not exploit misvaluation. The difference in performance between the two stock 
subsamples is formed by two opposing forces: the exploitation of relative misvaluation and 
a reversal price correction effect. The positive difference in favor of high RM stock acquirers 
indicates that the exploitation of misvaluation exists, and serves as a form of resistance in 
the deflation of share prices of overvalued acquirers that employ equity in purchasing less 
overvalued or more undervalued target firms. The difference between high and low RM 
stock acquisitions becomes insignificant for the buy-and-hold abnormal returns for a holding 
period of 60 months. That can be attributed to the fact that the reversal effect is fully 
redeployed. The question is, what would have been the difference between high and low 
                                                          
6
 Rosen (2006), Fu et al. (2013) and Ritter and Welch (2002) are some of the papers that use this methodology. 
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RM acquirers had they not exploited (for high) or not exploited (for low) their equity? In 
other words, how much is the reversal effect on its own? We can proxy and capture that 
effect if we observe the difference in the long-run performance between high and low RM 
cash acquirers. This difference captures only the long-run price correction effect, as cash 
acquirers are not associated with any exploitation or not of misvaluations, irrespective of 
their relative misvaluations. If we subtract the reversal effect as captured by the difference 
in cash acquisitions from the difference in stock acquisitions, the net effect represents the 
exploitation of stock in high RM deals versus the non-exploitation of stock in low RM deals. 
Table 3 depicts the difference-in-differences (dif-in-difs) estimator for 1, 2, 3 and 5 
years post acquisition announcement. The dif-in-difs estimator is positive and significant for 
the holding periods of 24, 36 and 60 months. It is positive but insignificant for the 12-month 
holding period. This is due to the fact that the reversal effect had not been fully redeployed 
within one year. These findings indicate that Shleifer and Vishny’s (2003) theoretical 
predictions hold. We report that the exploitation of overvalued equity in mergers and 
acquisitions has beneficial effects for the long-term shareholders of the acquiring firm.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
The difference-in-differences technique is used to measure the effect of a treatment 
after controlling for other effects through a control group. The treatment group is affected 
by the treatment, while the control group is not (Roberts and Whited, 2012). In our case, 
the treatment group is the stock acquisitions group and the control group is the cash 
acquisitions group. In a regression framework, the difference-in-differences technique can 
be described as follows: 
                                                     (6) 
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where Bidder Performance is a long-run performance measure (BHARs), stock is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one if the bid was paid with stock and zero 
otherwise, High is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the bid was classified as a 
high RM deal as described in Section 3 and zero otherwise, and Stock*High is the interaction 
term. The coefficient of the interaction variable β3 captures the misvaluation effect. Our 
hypothesis implies that if stock acquirers benefit by timing the market and bidding for less 
overvalued or more undervalued target firms, the β3 coefficient should be positive and 
significant. 
Table 4 presents results of the difference-in-differences estimator in a regression 
framework. The dependent variable is BHARs for the different holding periods. Apart from 
the Stock and the High dummy variables, we control for a number of variables that may 
affect acquirer performance. In regressions (2), (4), (6) and (8), we control for year and 
industry fixed effects. In all regressions, throughout the analysis, standard errors are 
clustered by industry and year (Petersen, 2009). The main variable of interest is the 
interactive term between the stock dummy and the high relative misvaluation dummy 
(Stock*High). The interactive term is positive and significant for the holding periods of 24, 
36 and 60 months, and positive but not significant for the 12-month holding period. These 
findings further support the results presented in the univariate analysis of the dif-in-difs 
approach. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Signaling is unlikely to bias the dif-in-difs estimator. Travlos (1987) argues that stock 
acquirers convey negative news to the market. Both high and low relative misvalation (RM) 
stock deals will be subject to a negative effect. We assume that the signaling effect will be of 
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equal magnitude for both high and low RM stock acquisitions. Hence, the first difference will 
not be affected. Cash acquisitions are expected to have a non-negative effect (Travlos, 
1987), either because they do not signal overvaluation or because they convey managerial 
confidence about the future prospect of the acquisition. The signaling effect is likely to be 
similar for both high and low RM cash deals. As a result, the second difference will also not 
be affected and the dif-in-difs estimator is not likely to be influenced by the signaling effect 
of the method of payment. 
Finally, the effect driven by the quality of the acquisition itself is unlikely to bias the 
dif-in-difs estimator. In our research set-up, we compare acquirers with acquirers. All sub-
groups are subject to the acquisition effect. Nevertheless, let’s assume managers who suffer 
from hubris are more likely to be observed in cash acquisitions (Malmendier and Tate, 
2008). Overconfident managers, on average, perform lower quality deals either because 
they overestimate synergies or overpay. This effect will not influence the dif-in-difs 
estimator, as it will be cancelled out in the second difference between high and low cash 
acquisitions. In addition, if we take the Tobin’s Q approach of high market-to-value 
acquirers and assume that overvalued acquirers may exhibit elements of higher quality 
management, that would still not affect our dif-in-difs estimator. Servaes (1991) shows that 
high Q bidders generate higher returns. If high RM deals exhibit better managerial quality 
skill elements, the difference between high and low RM deals will be biased in favor of high 
RM acquisitions. However, that will be the case for both stock and cash acquisitions. This 
bias will be eliminated in the difference of the differences of the two subgroups. In sections 
7 and 8, for robustness reasons, we check whether acquisition premium or synergy gains are 
likely to drive our dif-in-difs estimator. We do not find any such evidence. Comparing the 
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long-run performance of acquirers with that of non-acquiring firms is not the most 
appropriate framework within which to draw conclusion on the misvaluation effects, as this 
comparison captures a number of different effects. One is an acquisition quality effect, a 
second is a signaling effect and a third is the exploitation of overvalued equity if the sample 
refers to stock acquisitions. Takeovers are major corporate events which attract investors’ 
attention, and the signals conveyed to the market are important in re-evaluating firms. Non-
acquiring matched firms are exposed to neither an acquisition effect nor a signaling effect. 
Hence, the difference between acquirers and non-acquirers is the sum of both of these 
effects. If we refer to stock acquirers, the difference would also capture the exploitation of 
overvalued equity in addition to the other two effects. Therefore, employing non-acquiring 
firms as a control sample is not always the most appropriate approach, especially if the aim 
is to test Shleifer and Vishny’s (2003) theoretical predictions. 
Fu et al. (2013) examine the long-run share price performance of overvalued 
acquirers versus overvalued non-acquiring firms and report that acquirers underperform 
non-acquirers. They do not distinguish between stock and cash acquirers. While they control 
for overvaluation, the difference in performance is a mixture of a great deal of effects, such 
as acquisition quality, signaling and exploitation of overvalued equity. Akbulut (2013) 
compares stock acquirers with similarly misvalued non-acquiring firms and finds that 
acquirers underperform is mainly driven by highly overvalued acquirers. The difference in 
performance is again a combination of the acquisition effect, signaling and exploitation of 
overvalued equity. The more pronounced results against overvalued acquirers are likely to 
be driven by two effects: first, overvalued acquirers are more likely to be infected by hubris, 
leading to worse quality acquisitions. Second, the signaling effect is likely to be stronger for 
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overvalued stock acquirers. Non-acquiring firms may be overvalued of a similar magnitude, 
but by taking no corporate action, they do not reveal any news to the market about their 
misvaluation. Finally, the exploitation of overvalued equity in favor of acquirers does not 
seem to be high enough to counterbalance the other two negative effects. In any case, the 
difference in performance, which is a combination of three different effects, is not 
informative enough to draw fruitful conclusions about the effects of exploiting 
overvaluation or not. The studies of Fu et al. (2013) and Akbulut (2013) conclude that 
acquirers destroy more value for their shareholders as compared to non-acquirers after 
controlling for misvaluation. However, their research frameworks are not informative 
enough to provide direct evidence in favor of or against the market timing hypothesis of 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003). Prior studies (Loughran and Vijh, 1997) have already established 
this finding. Our findings provide direct evidence that paying with overvalued equity serves 
as resistance against the deflation of overvalued acquirers. 
 
 
 
5. Are Stock Acquirers Comparable to Cash Acquirers? 
One of the main questions associated with the difference-in-differences approach is 
whether stock acquirers are comparable to cash acquirers. Do acquirers’ characteristics 
impact the decision of the method of payment to be employed in the M&A process? 
Empirical evidence shows that acquirers, when overvalued, are more likely to use equity as 
a means of financing their acquisitions (Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005; Dong et al., 2006; Ang 
and Cheng, 2006; Ben-David et al., 2014). Our descriptive statistics on the misvaluation of 
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acquirers also confirms this evidence and shows that stock acquirers are more overvalued 
than cash acquirers. One of the main effects that the dif-in-difs approach aims to capture is 
the reversal effect, as proxied by the reversal that takes place for high versus low RM cash 
acquirers. Since stock acquirers are more overvalued than cash, the reversal effect should 
be more pronounced for the stock subsample. To alleviate this problem, we employ the 
minimum distance Mahalanobis matching technique7 in order to identify cash acquirers that 
are comparable to stock acquirers in terms of their relative misvaluation and also acquirers’ 
misvaluation. This technique deals with selection bias based on observable characteristics 
by minimizing the number of standard observations in a multidimensional space between 
stock and cash acquirers. At the first stage, we identify one cash acquirer that matches each 
high RM stock acquirer on the basis of the relative misvaluation measure. We repeat the 
same process for low RM acquirers. We identify one cash acquirer that matches each low 
RM stock acquirer on the basis of the relative misvaluation measure. In this way, high RM 
stock and cash acquirers as well as low RM stock and cash acquirers are exposed to the 
same level of relative misvaluation. In Panel A of Table 5, we report the regression analysis 
results. The interactive term Stock*High remains positive and significant for all holding 
periods. We repeat the same process and we now match stock with cash acquirers on the 
basis of the relative misvaluation variable and acquirers’ misvaluation as well (Panel B). The 
dif-in-difs estimator remains positive and significant. The results are robust even without 
controlling for industry and year fixed effects. In untabulated results, we repeat the same 
process, where we identify five and ten cash acquirers for each high or low stock acquirer, 
respectively. The results remain robust. 
                                                          
7
 Our results remain robust if we achieve appropriate matches by using propensity score matching 
methodology 
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[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Relative misvaluations and acquirers’ misvaluation are the obvious characteristics on 
which stock and cash acquirers are likely to differ. In addition, we control for a number of 
extra characteristics which may influence the choice of the method of payment (Faccio and 
Masulis., 2005). We repeat the Mahalanobis matching technique as described above and we 
match stock with cash acquirers based on variables such as cash to total assets, return on 
equity, sales growth, debt-to-equity ratio, price-to-earnings ratio, total assets, bidder 
performance in the year before the acquisition, the standard deviation of bidder daily 
returns in the year prior to the acquisition, the relative size of the deal measured as the deal 
value over the market value of bidder’s equity, the market-to-book value ratio of the bidder 
as measured 42 days prior to the acquisition and the actual level of debt. Vermaelen and Xu 
(2014) and Uysal (2011) show that the capital structure of the firm matters in the acquisition 
decision process. Pinkowitz et al. (2013) argue that cash rish firms are less like to perform 
cash than stock takeovers. Further details on the construction of the variable can be found 
in the Appendix in Panel C. 
The results of the regression analysis are presented in Table 6. Panels A, B and C 
present one, five and ten matchings of cash acquirers for each stock acquirer respectively. 
The variable of interest is the interactive term Stock*High, which is positive and significant 
for the 24-, 36- and 60-month holding periods, indicating that the effect for stock acquirers 
that take advantage of higher relative misvaluations is positive. The results for the 12-month 
holding period are positive but not significant. The exploitation of relative misvaluations for 
stock acquirers serves as resistance to the deflationary effect of overvalued acquirers, and 
more time is required for the reversal effect to be redeployed. The results reported in 
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Section 4 are robust even after we match stock with cash acquirers on a number of 
observable characteristics that could have affected the choice of the method of payment. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
6. Intensify Relative Misvaluations 
The classification of high versus low RM deals is described in Section 3. We classify 
deals as high RM if the relative misvaluation measure (RM) is higher than the first quartile of 
the positive values of RM. If the proposed research framework in this study captures 
misvaluation benefits for stock acquirers, as it claims, the effects would be even more 
pronounced if we examined deals for which the misvaluation difference between bidders 
and targets is even higher. For robustness, we intensify the measure of relative misvaluation 
and reclassify deals as high RM deals if the RM measure is higher than the median (Panel A 
of Table 7) or belongs in the top quartile of the positive values of the RM measure (Panel B 
of Table 7). Results are presented in Table 7. We employ the Mahalanobis matching 
technique with all control variables as described in Section 5. All regressions include year 
and industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by industry and year. The results 
become stronger and more pronounced as we intensify the definition of high RM. The 
coefficients for the interactive term (Stock*High) are -0.003, 0.093, 0.177 and 0.232 for the 
four holding periods of 12, 24, 36 and 60 months, respectively, with the initial definition of 
the high RM dummy (the RM is higher than the first quartile of the positive values of RM – 
see Table 6, regressions (1), (2), (3) & (4)). When we intensify the definition of high RM and 
keep deals for which the RM is higher than the median of the positive values of RM, the 
coefficient of the interactive term (Stock*High) becomes even more positive and even more 
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significant. It is 0.063 (insignificant at the 25% level), 0.137, 0.296 and 0.289 for the holding 
periods of 12, 24, 36 and 60 months, respectively (Panel A of Table 7). The coefficients 
increase in magnitude even more if we further intensify the definition of high RM as those 
for which the RM measure belongs in the top quartile of the positive values of RM. The 
coefficients of the interactive term (Stock*High) are 0.158 (significant), 0.189, 0.370 and 
0.458 for the holding periods of 12, 24, 36 and 60 months, respectively (Panel B of Table 7). 
Our findings indicate that the higher the relative misvaluation between acquiring and target 
firms, the higher the benefits associated with the employment of stock as a method of 
financing takeover deals. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Our findings provide direct evidence that paying with overvalued equity serves as 
resistance against the deflationary forces of overvalued acquirers. Are the shareholders of 
overvalued stock acquirers better off than those of non-acquiring firms? Fu et al. (2013), 
Akbulut (2013) and Ben-David et al. (2014), as well as prior literature, indicate that this not 
the case. Are the shareholders of overvalued stock acquirers better off than those of cash 
overvalued acquirers? In untabulated results, the univariate analysis results show that the 
long-run performance of high RM stock deals is not statistically different from that of high 
RM cash deals after matching acquirers on the characteristics discussed above or after 
intensifying the measure of misvaluation. Does this mean that taking advantage of 
overvalued equity to acquire less overvalued or more undervalued target firms does not 
serve the long-term interests of bidders’ shareholders? No, this is not the case either. The 
performance of overvalued acquirers depends on many more effects apart from this one. 
Our study helps to shed light on the forces that drive the underperformance of overvalued 
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stock acquirers. If anything should not be blamed, it is the exploitation of equity 
overvaluation. Our results indicate that signaling plays an important role in determining the 
performance of overvalued stock acquirers. The main effects that differ between high RM 
stock and high RM cash deals are the following: stock deals convey negative news while 
cash deals do not, and stock deals benefit by paying with their overvalued equity while cash 
ones do not. The fact that the performance difference between high RM stock and cash 
acquirers is statistically insignificant indicates that the two opposing forces cancel one 
another out, proving that the benefits of exploiting overvaluation are cancelled out by the 
negative signaling effect. Cash acquirers or non-acquiring companies that do not convey 
much news to the market about their valuation remain overvalued for longer. 
 
7. Do Overvalued Stock Acquirers Overpay? 
One of the assumptions of the difference-in-differences framework is that the 
acquisition quality effect does not bias the dif-in-difs estimator, as discussed in Section 4. In 
this section and the following one, we account for this assumption. We test whether the 
positive effect of exploiting overvalued equity in favor of overvalued acquirers is driven by 
underpayment or by performing better quality acquisitions. Fu et al. (2013) argue that 
overvalued stock acquirers overpay for their targets. If this is the case, that would work in 
favor of the dif-in-difs estimator. However, the research framework of Fu et al. (2013) differ 
from ours, as they capture an overvaluation effect only and we cannot draw fruitful 
conclusions about overvalued stock acquirers. They show that the premiums offered by 
overvalued stock acquirers are significantly higher than those offered by undervalued stock 
acquirers. This finding is quite expected. Overvalued acquirers, which are more likely to be 
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infected by hubris or have higher growth opportunities, are more likely to overpay. The 
natural question that arises is whether the overpayment is driven by the fact that the 
acquiring firm is overvalued or due to the method of payment. In other words, had 
overvalued acquirers employed cash as a method of payment, would they have not 
overpaid? 
To empirically examine this issue, we calculate acquisition premiums by using two 
measures. We estimate target firms’ cumulative abnormal returns around the acquisition 
announcement date as: 
                    ∑       
 
          (7) 
where Target CARs(-t,+T) is target cumulative abnormal returns from    days before 
the announcement of the deal up to T days after the announcement, Ri,t is the target firm’s 
return on day t and Rm,t is the Datastream value-weighted market index for the US market. 
As a first measure, We follow Schwert (1996) and estimate target cumulative abnormal 
returns for the period 42 days prior to the acquisition date up to the completion day (CD) 
[                     . As a second measure, we estimate target cumulative abnormal 
returns for the period one day prior to the acquisition date up to one day after the 
announcement [                    (Fu et al., 2013). Premium measures based on 
stock exchange ratios are not appropriate for our research framework, as we need to 
estimate premiums for cash acquirers as well. 
In order to answer the question of whether overvalued stock acquirers overpay 
because of their overvaluation or because of the method of payment, we apply the 
difference-in-differences framework as described above. Each cash acquirer is matched with 
each stock acquirer by employing a Mahalanobis matching technique based on all the 
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variables as described in Section 5. Table 8 presents the one-to-one matching approach. In 
unreported results, we match each of the stock acquirers with five and ten cash acquirers 
and the findings remain robust. Table 8 presents the univariate results for the two 
acquisition premium measures (Panels A and B). Findings for the overall sample indicate 
that overvalued acquirers overpay as compared to their non-overvalued counterparts, as 
expected. This holds for both stock and cash acquirers. Targets of high RM stock acquirers 
receive 15.93% (statistically significant at the 1% level) higher abnormal returns compared 
to targets of low RM stock acquirers for the longer period acquisition premium measure 
(CARs(-42,CD)), while for the shorter-term measure (CARs(-1,+1)), the difference is 5.67% 
(statistically significant at the 1% level). Fu et al. (2013) present very similar results. They 
report an acquisition premium difference of 15.85% and 5.46% respectively for the two 
measures in favor of overvalued stock acquirers. The question is whether overvalued cash 
acquirers overpay. Findings in Table 8 show that high RM cash acquirers also overpay as 
compared to low RM cash acquirers. The interesting finding is that cash acquirers overpay 
by more as compared to the difference estimated in the stock subsample. The difference in 
premiums for the targets of high versus low RM cash acquirers is 21.12%, for the longer-
term measure, and 14.85% for the shorter-term measure. The difference of the differences 
is -5.20% and -9.17% for the two measures, respectively. That implies that stock acquirers 
overpay because they are overvalued, but would have overpaid much more had they used 
cash. It is overvaluation that drives overpayment and not the fact that they employed stock 
as a means of financing. 
 [Insert Table 8 about here] 
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Table 9 presents the multivariate regression analysis results for acquisition 
premiums. We control for a number of variables which could have affected premiums. 
Further details on the construction of the control variables can be found in the Appendix, in 
Panel B. The results offer similar conclusions. The interactive term (Stock*High) is negative 
and significant for both measures of acquisition premiums, suggesting that although stock 
acquirers overpay, they would have paid even higher premiums had they employed cash to 
finance the acquisition. Panels A, B and C presents results for one-to-one, one-to-five and 
one-to-ten matches between stock and cash acquirers. In all regressions, we control for 
industry and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by industry and year. The 
results remain robust even if we do not control for year and industry fixed effects. 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
Following the findings on acquisitions premiums, the question that arises is the 
following: Is the positive BHARs dif-in-difs estimator reported in previous sections driven by 
the fact that overvalued acquirers overpay less than what they could have paid had they 
used cash? To account for that issue, we control for acquisition premiums by matching stock 
with cash acquirers on this dimension. The Mahalanobis matching technique, as described in 
previous sections, is used to match each cash acquirer with each stock acquirer on the basis 
of acquisition premium. By doing so, both stock and cash acquirers are comparable in terms 
of premiums, as they offer the same amount to their target firms. Panel A of Table 10 
presents the multivariate regression analysis results for buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
(BHARs) after each stock acquirer is matched with one cash acquirer based on the Target 
CARs(-42,CD) variable. The dependent variable is BHARs for the different periods. The 
variable of interest is the interactive term (Stock*High), which captures the dif-in-difs 
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between the two subsamples. The interactive variable is positive and significant, indicating 
that premiums are unlikely to affect the dif-in-difs estimator. We repeat the same process 
by matching stock with cash acquirers based on premiums and all other variables (Panel B) 
as described in Section 5. The results remain quantitatively similar and not affected by 
premiums. We re-run our analysis by using Target CARs(-1,+1) as the matching variable. 
Findings are presented in Panels C and D of Table 10. In untabulated results, we match each 
stock acquirer with five or ten cash acquirers and the overall picture is similar. 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
 
8. Do Overvalued Stock Acquirers Perform Better Acquisitions? 
The findings presented in the section above indicate that although overvalued stock 
acquirers do not overpay as much as they would have if they had used cash as a means of 
financing the deals, this factor does not seem to drive the positive effects emanating from 
the exploitation of overvalued equity. Apart from the payment involved in a transaction, the 
synergies created from a takeover deal are important in understanding the quality of the 
acquisition. The aim of this section is to examine the synergies created by overvalued stock 
acquirers and whether this affects and drives the positive dif-in-difs estimator reported in 
favor of overvalued stock acquirers. To investigate synergies created (or not) by the various 
subgroups, we examine the operating performance following takeover deals. We follow 
Healy et al. (1992), and the main measure of operating performance is Earnings Before 
Interest Taxes and Depreciation (EBITDA) divided by total assets. The measure of Operating 
Return on Assets (ROA) is decomposed into Operating Profit Margin, calculated as EBITDA 
divided by sales, and asset turnover calculated as sales divided by assets. 
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  (8) 
We calculate the pre and post abnormal performance (operating ROA, operating 
profit and asset turnover) for the merged firms. In the period prior to the acquisition, 
performance is calculated as the market value weighted average of the target’s and 
acquiring firm’s performance. We also calculate the industry median performance of the 
acquirer’s and the target’s industry, and a market value weighted average is estimated. 
Abnormal performance is estimated as the difference between the market value weighted 
average of the bidder and target’s performance and the market value weighted average of 
the bidder and target industry performance. Pre-acquisition abnormal performance 
                   is the median value of the abnormal performance in the pre-merger 
period (years -3 to -1). The post-acquisition abnormal performance                     is 
calculated in the same way, but for the acquiring firm only, and is the median of the post-
acquisition years (+1 to +5). We then run the following cross-section OLS regressions to 
estimate abnormal changes in performance due to the takeover: 
                                          (9) 
The coefficient of the pre-acquisition performance variable (                  
measures the relationship between performance in the pre- and post-acquisition periods. 
The constant (α) of the above regression captures the average change in the industry-
adjusted abnormal performance due to the takeover effect. The values of the constant (α) 
for the different subgroups are reported in Table 11. 
We apply the difference-in-differences methodology in order to capture the net 
effect for overvalued stock acquirers. Cash acquirers are matched with stock acquirers 
through the Mahalanobis matching technique based on all control variables as described in 
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Section 5. Panels A, B and C present results for one-to-one, one-to-five and one-to-ten 
matches, respectively. We present results for Operating ROA, operating profit and asset 
turnover. The results in Panel A for the operating ROA (EBITDA/Assets) measure is negative 
for all four subgroups, indicating that all types of acquirers fail to create synergies through 
takeovers. High RM stock acquirers underperform as compared to low RM ones, indicating 
that they fail to create superior synergies for their shareholders. For the different 
performance measures and matching approaches, the difference between high and low RM 
cash acquirers is either positive, close to zero or negative, and if negative, it is less negative 
as compared with the difference coming from the stock subsamples. The overall net effects 
(dif-in-difs estimator) for high RM deals is negative, suggesting that overvalued acquirers do 
not choose target firms which can generate superior synergy gains. These findings lead us to 
two conclusions. First, the positive dif-in-difs estimator for buy-and-hold abnormal returns is 
unlikely to be influenced by the acquisition quality, giving further support to our hypothesis. 
Second, if overvaluation is the motive for such acquisitions, it is not surprising to observe 
that high RM stock acquirers fail to obtain synergistic gains. 
[Insert Table 11 about here] 
 
9. Alternative Measure of Misvaluation 
The Rhodes-Kropf et al.’s (2005) decomposing methodology has been widely used in 
the corporate finance literature to identify misevaluation. Despite its popularity, for 
robustness reasons, we employ an additional method to capture merging firms 
misevaluation at firm level. Motivated by the asset pricing literature, we employ Fama-
French five factor model (2015). Fama and French (2015) introduce to two additional 
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factors, profitability and investment, to the traditional three factor model and claim that the 
new model can explain variation in returns. 
The rational of employing the five factor Fama-French model is the following: the 
variation in returns that cannot be explained by the five factors suggested by Fama and 
French will be captured in the constant. The five-factor model will generate Jensen's alpha 
while controlling for the covariance of returns with the five factors. (Nguyen and Swanson, 
2009). The constant would capture excess returns when deviating from the benchmark. The 
model takes the form below: 
               (         )                                   (10) 
Where    is bidders’ and targets’ monthly returns respectively for a period of 36 months 
prior to the acquisition announcement,    is the risk-free rate of return, (         ) is the 
market premium,      is the Small-minus-Big factor,      is the High-minus-Low factor, 
     is robust-minus-weak profitability factor and      is the low-minus-high investment 
factor. All factors have been obtained from Kenneth French’s website. A negative (positive) 
alpha would indicate that a particular bidder or target firm exhibits negative (positive) 
abnormal returns and can therefore be classified as overvalued (undervalued). 
To construct the relative misevaluation ratio, we follow the same approach that is adopted 
in earlier sections of the paper and calculate the difference as follows: 
Relative Misvaluation=        -         (11) 
Negative values of the relative misevaluation indicate that the bidder is more overvalued or 
less undervalued than the target firm.  
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We re-run the entire analysis and based on the various robustness tests, the results 
hold. Table 12 shows the results of the difference-in-differences estimator. For brevity, in 
Table 12, in all models, the dependant variable is Buy-and-Hold abnormal returns for the 36 
months window. Similar results (unreported and available upon request) are observed for 
other windows such as 24 and 60 months. In all models, we control for year and industry 
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by industry and year. In model 1, Buy-and-Hold 
abnormal returns (BHARs26) are regressed on a stock dummy, on a High dummy, the 
interaction of the two and a number of control variables. High is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one if the relative misvaluation (RM) measure of the deal as described in 
formula (11) is negative and zero otherwise. The variable of interest is the interactive term 
Stock*High, which is positive and significant at the 1% significance level, indicating that the 
effect for stock acquirers that take advantage of higher relative misvaluations is positive. In 
models 2 and 3, cash acquirers are matched with stock acquirers through a minimum 
distance Mahalanobis technique based on the Relative Misvaluation (RM) measure (model 
2) and also based on the Relative Misvaluation (RM) measure and Bidder Misvaluation 
(model 3) respectively. In models 4, 5 and 6, cash acquirers are matched with stock 
acquirers through a minimum distance Mahalanobis technique based on all variables as 
described in the Appendix. One stock acquirer is matched with one, five or ten cash 
acquirers in models 4, 5 and 6 respectively. The variable of interest which is the interactive 
terms remains positive and statistically significant confirming our main hypothesis. In model 
7, High is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the relative misvaluation (RM) of 
the deal is lower than the median of the negative values of the RM measure. In model 8, 
High is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the relative misvaluation (RM) of the 
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deal belongs in the bottom quartile of the negative values of the RM measure. The aim in 
models 7 and 8 is to intensify the relative misevaluation measure in a similar manner as in 
table 7. The interactive variable is model 8 becomes even more positive and significant 
indicating that the more overvalued the bidder is as compared to the target, the higher the 
misevaluation benefits as described by Shleifer and Vishny (2003). Finally, in model 9, cash 
acquirers are matched with stock acquirers through a minimum distance Mahalanobis 
technique based on target premiums (TargetCARs(-42,CD)) and all variables as described in 
the Appendix, Panel C. In model (10), the matching takes place on an alternative meaure of 
target premiums (TargetCARs(-1,+1)) and all variables as described in the Appendix, Panel C. 
Again the interactive variable of interest is positive and statistically significant. 
In unreported results, as with the Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) decomposition model, 
we further examine whether overvalued stock acquirers pay lower premiums and whether 
that could drive the positive dif-in-difs estimator. We do not find any evidence in favour of 
this argument. We also control whether overvalued stock acquirers choose better quality 
deals. We provide evidence that synergistic gains do not impact on the positive dif-in-difs 
estimator. In large, the results hold and support the misevaluation hypothesis when we 
employ an alternative approach to capturing misevaluation. 
[Insert Table 12 about here] 
10. Calendar-Time Approach 
To address the issue of event clustering, this section uses a calendar time approach 
to estimate bidders’ long-run abnormal returns for the various portfolios. Monthly returns 
are estimated for various windows. For brevity, in this section we report results for the 36 
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months window following the acquisition announcement. In unreported results, the findings 
are robust for alternative long-run windows.  
Monthly return time series are calculated by using a calendar-time (not event-time) 
approach (Mitchell and Pulvino, 2001). It is the value weighted return across all merger 
deals in each portfolio at a given month. The portfolios are rebalanced each month to 
include firms that performed a takeover during the previous month while also to remove 
firms that have reached the end of the 36-month period. 
The average monthly excess returns for the three-year post acquisition period is the 
intercept (a) from the time-series regression of the calendar portfolio by estimating the 
following three models: the CAPM, the Fama and French three-factor model (1993) and the 
Carhart (1997) four-factor model as follows: 
                 (       )           (12) 
                 (       )                             (13) 
                 (       )                                   
  (14) 
Where Rp,t is the value weighted monthly return of the calendar portfolio at month t, Rf is 
the monthly risk-free rate of return, Rm,t is the monthly return on the market index at month 
t, SMBt is the monthly return on small minus large firms at month t, HMLt is the monthly 
return on high book-to-market minus low book-to-market firms at month t and UMBt is the 
monthly return on previous 12-month return winners minus previous 12-month loser firms 
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at month t. βMkt,p, βSMB,p, βHML,p, βUMD,p are the regression parameters for each portfolio and 
εi is the error term. 
Table 13 depicts the results for the entire period of 33 years (396 months). Panel A 
presents results from estimating the CAPM for the various portfolios as earlier in the paper. 
For the overvalued stock portfolio, the constant alpha is negative 12 basis points while the 
alpha for the undervalued stock is even more negative (48 basis points). The long-short 
strategy of the two portfolios generates a positive alpha of 35 basis points. Similarly, a long-
short strategy on overvalued cash versus undervalued cash acquirers generates a negative 
alpha of 11 basis points. The difference-in-differences of the two strategies generates a 
positive alpha of 46 basis points which is marginally insignificant at 15% significance level. 
Panel B presents results when the Fama-French 3 factor model is employed. Alphas 
for the various portfolios are presented by most importantly, the difference-in-differences 
estimator is positive (57 basis points) and statistically significant at the 10% significance 
level. Similarly, in Panel C, we employ the Carhart four factor model. The difference-in-
differences estimator remains positive (58 basis points) and statistically significant at the 
10% significance level. Panel D presents the raw returns of each portfolio. The dif-in-difs 
estimator is slightly positive but insignificant. Raw returns are not risk adjusted and not the 
most appropriate measure for our setting. 
Overall, the calendar-time approach also shows that the net outcome for acquirers 
that are overvalued and exploit their stock as a means of financing their deals is positive 
offering extra support to the analysis adopted in this paper. 
[Insert Table 13 about here] 
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11. Conclusion 
The market timing hypothesis of mergers and acquisitions claims that the long-term 
shareholders of acquirers could benefit if they purchase less overvalued or more 
undervalued target firms and convert their overvalued equity into less overvalued or more 
undervalued hard assets. Despite the theoretical predictions of this hypothesis, there is an 
ongoing debate in the empirical finance literature of whether this holds or not. On the one 
hand, Savor and Lu (2009) support this argument; while on the other hand, Fu et al. (2013) 
and Akbulut (2013) offer evidence against it. We contribute to the debate by isolating, 
capturing and measuring the effect emanating from the exploitation of overvaluation by 
employing equity in financing acquisition activity. Overvalued stock acquirers are subject to 
four opposing forces. First, due to their overvaluation, they are subject to a natural long-run 
price correction and a natural share price decline. Second, the announcement of stock 
acquisitions signals negative news to the market with respect to the firm’s valuation. Third, 
there is an effect coming from the quality of the acquisition. Finally, they are subject to the 
effect of the exploitation of overvalued equity. To draw fruitful conclusions about the 
theoretical prediction of Shleifer and Vishny’s (2003) hypothesis, we eliminate the first three 
forces and isolate the fourth. To do so, we employ a difference-in-differences approach. The 
first difference estimates the long-run performance of stock acquirers that exploit relative 
misvaluation versus stock acquirers that do not take advantage of their overvalued equity. 
This difference captures both effects related to the exploitation of overvalued equity and 
non-valuation related effects. The second difference estimates the difference between cash 
acquirers that are more overvalued than their targets and cash acquirers that are less 
overvalued than their targets; in other words, cash acquirers that could have exploited their 
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relative misvaluation but did not. This difference captures only non-valuation related 
effects, as the relative misvaluation of cash acquirers is not associated with any misvaluation 
benefits. The difference between these two differences alleviates the non-valuation related 
effects and isolates the valuation related effects. Our findings indicate that the difference-
in-differences (dif-in-difs) estimator indicates a positive effect of around 15%-28% for a 
period two to five years post acquisition announcement for firms that exploited 
overvaluation by undertaking stock acquisitions versus those that did not. We further 
control whether overvalued stock acquirers perform better quality acquisition or 
underpayment drives the positive dif-in-difs estimator, but we find no evidence in favor of 
that. 
The overall long-run performance of stock acquirers may be negative on average. 
The one thing that definitely should not be blamed for contributing towards driving 
acquirers’ share prices down is the predictions of Shleifer and Vishny’s model. The 
exploitation of relative misvaluations for stock acquirers serves as resistance to the 
deflationary effect of overvalued equity. The underperformance of stock acquirers can 
mainly be attributed to the signaling effect of the announcement of the equity offering. 
Despite the positive effect coming from the transformation of overvalued equity into less 
overvalued or undervalued hard assets, the performance of overvalued stock acquirers is 
not statistically different from that of overvalued cash acquirers. This indicates that the 
negative signaling effect is offset by the positive results of the exploitation of overvaluation. 
Our results also indicate that the informational content coming from various corporate 
events is an important factor for capital markets. 
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Appendix 
 Variable Definition 
Panel A: Control Variable for Buy-and Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) - Tables 4, 5, 6, 7, 10 
Stock Dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the deal is 100% 
financed by equity and 0 otherwise 
High 
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the relative 
misvaluation (RM) of the deal is higher than the first quartile of the 
positive values of the RM measure and 0 otherwise 
Stock*High Interactive variable: the stock dummy variable times the High 
dummy variable 
Cash/TA 
Acquirer's Cash scaled by acquirer's total assets as measured at the 
end of the fiscal year prior to the announcement of the deal, 
Datastream Code: Cash: WC02005, Total Assets: WC02999 
Return on Equity 
Acquirer's return on equity as measured at the end of fiscal year 
prior to the announcement of the deal, Datastream Code: 
WC08301 
Sales Growth 
The proportional change in sales calculated as the logarithm of net 
sales at the end of year t over the net sales at the end of year (t-1). 
Year t is the end of fiscal year prior to the announcement of the 
deal, Datastream Code of Net Sales: WC01001 
Debt/Equity(-1)-Bid 
Acquirer's total term debt scaled by its market value of equity as 
measured at the end of fiscal year prior to the announcement of 
the deal, Datastream code: WC08231 
PE(-42days)-Bid Acquirer's share price divided by its earnings per share as 
measured 42 days prior to the announcement of the deal 
Log(TA) 
The logarithm of acquirer's total assets as measured at the end of 
fiscal year prior to the announcement of the deal, Datastream 
Code: WC02999 
BHARs(-12,-1) 
Acquirer Buy-and-Hold abnormal returns for the period 12 months 
prior to 1 month prior to the announcement of the deal. The 
estimation of BHARs is described in Section 4 of the paper. 
St.Dev.(-253,-42)-Bid Acquirer's standard deviation of daily return for the period 253 to 
42 days prior to the announcement of the deal 
Relative Size 
Value of the deal from Thomson Financial SDC divided by 
acquirer's market value of equity as measured 20 days prior to the 
announcement of the deal 
MTBV(-42 days)-Bid Acquirer's market value of equity divided by its book value of 
equity as measured 42 days prior to the announcement of the deal 
Hostile Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the deal is classified as 
"hostile" by Thomson Financial SDC and zero otherwise 
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Tender Offer Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the deal is flagged as 
"Tender Offer" by Thomson Financial SDC and zero otherwise 
TarTerm Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if there is a flag for target 
termination fee from Thomson Financial SDC and zero otherwise 
BidLock 
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if bidder lockup 
provisions are included as flagged from Thomson Financial SDC and 
zero otherwise 
NoDealsinYear The number of acquisitions announced by the same bidder in a 
given year 
 
 Panel B: Control Variable for Target Premium - Table 9 
Ln(MV) (-42 days)-Bid The natural logarithm of acquirer's market value of equity as 
measured 42 days prior to the announcement of the acquisition 
Ln(MV) (-42 days)-Tar The natural logarithm of target's market value of equity as 
measured 42 days prior to the announcement of the acquisition 
MTBV(-42 days)-Bid Acquirer's market value of equity divided by its book value of 
equity as measured 42 days prior to the announcement of the deal 
MTBV(-42 days)-Tar Target's market value of equity divided by its book value of equity 
as measured 42 days prior to the announcement of the deal 
Debt/Equity(-1)-Bid 
Acquirer's total term debt scaled by its market value of equity as 
measured at the end of fiscal year prior to the announcement of 
the deal, Datastream code: WC08231 
Debt/Equity(-1)-Tar 
Target's total term debt scaled by its market value of equity as 
measured at the end of fiscal year prior to the announcement of 
the deal, Datastream code: WC08231 
Operating ROA-Bid 
Acquirer's operating income (WC01250) scaled by its market value 
of equity as measured at the end of fiscal year prior to the 
announcement of the deal 
Operating ROA-Tar 
Target's operating income (WC01250) scaled by its market value of 
equity as measured at the end of fiscal year prior to the 
announcement of the deal 
BHARs(-12,-1) 
Acquirer Buy-and-Hold abnormal returns for the period 12 months 
prior to 1 month prior to the announcement of the deal. The 
estimation of BHARs is described in Section 4 of the paper. 
St.Dev.(-253,-42)-Bid Acquirer's standard deviation of daily return for the period 253 to 
42 days prior to the announcement of the deal 
Hostile Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the deal is classified as 
"hostile" by Thomson Financial SDC and zero otherwise 
Tender Offer Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the deal is flagged as 
"Tender Offer" by Thomson Financial SDC and zero otherwise 
TarTerm Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if there is a flag for target 
termination fee from Thomson Financial SDC and zero otherwise 
BidLock 
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if bidder lockup 
provisions are included as flagged from Thomson Financial SDC and 
zero otherwise 
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NoDealsinYear The number of acquisitions announced by the same bidder in a 
given year 
 
 Panel C: Variable used in the matching Mahalanobis technique 
cash to total assets 
Acquirer's Cash scaled by acquirer's total assets as measured at the 
end of the fiscal year prior to the announcement of the deal, 
Datastream Code: Cash: WC02005, Total Assets: WC02999 
Return on equity 
Acquirer's return on equity as measured at the end of fiscal year 
prior to the announcement of the deal, Datastream Code: 
WC08301 
Sales growth 
The proportional change in sales calculated as the logarithm of net 
sales at the end of year t over the net sales at the end of year (t-1). 
Year t is the end of fiscal year prior to the announcement of the 
deal, Datastream Code of Net Sales: WC01001 
Debt –to-equity ratio 
Acquirer's total term debt scaled by its market value of equity as 
measured at the end of fiscal year prior to the announcement of 
the deal, Datastream code: WC08231 
Price-to-earnings ratio Acquirer's share price divided by its earnings per share as 
measured 42 days prior to the announcement of the deal 
Total assets 
The logarithm of acquirer's total assets as measured at the end of 
fiscal year prior to the announcement of the deal, Datastream 
Code: WC02999 
Bidder performance 
Acquirer Buy-and-Hold abnormal returns for the period 12 months 
prior to 1 month prior to the announcement of the deal. The 
estimation of BHARs is described in Section 4 of the paper. 
The standard deviation of 
bidder daily returns 
Acquirer's standard deviation of daily return for the period 253 to 
42 days prior to the announcement of the deal 
The relative size of deal 
Value of the deal from Thomson Financial SDC divided by 
acquirer's market value of equity as measured 20 days prior to the 
announcement of the deal 
The market-to-book value ratio Acquirer's market value of equity divided by its book value of 
equity as measured 42 days prior to the announcement of the deal 
Level of debt Acquirer's level of total debt 
 
References 
Akbulut, M., 2013. Do overvaluation-driven acquisitions really benefit acquirer shareholders? Journal 
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 48, 1025–1055. 
Ang, J., Cheng, Y., 2006. Direct evidence on the market-driven acquisition theory. Journal of Financial 
Research 29, 199–216. 
  
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
46 
 
Ben-David, I., Drake, M., Roulstone, D., 2015. Acquirer Valuation and Acquisition Decisions: 
Identifying Mispricing Using Short Interest. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 50, 1-32. 
Bernard, V., Thomas, J.K., 1990, Evidence that stock prices do not fully reflect the implications of 
current earnings for future earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 13, 305-340. 
Carhart, M., 1997. On persistence in mutual fund performance. Journal of Finance 52, 57-82. 
Daniel, K., Hirshleifer, D., Subrahmanyam, A., 1998. Investor Psychology and Security Market Under- 
and Overreactions. Journal of Finance 53, 1839-1885. 
DeBodt, E., Cousin, J., Roll, R. 2015. The Full Stock Payment Marginalization in M&A Transactions. 
Working paper 
De Bondt, W., Thaler, R, 1985. Does the Stock Market Overreact? Journal of Finance 40, 793-805. 
DeAngelo, H., DeAngelo, L., Stulz, R., 2010. Seasoned equity offerings, market timing, and the 
corporate lifecycle. Journal of Financial Economics 95, 275-295. 
De Maesschalck, R., Jouan-Rimbaud, D., Massart, D., 2000. The Mahalanobis distance. Chemometrics 
and Intelligent Laboratory Systems 50, 1-18. 
Dong, M., Hirshleifer, D., Richardson, S., Teoh, S., 2006. Does investor misvaluation drive the 
takeover market? Journal of Finance 61, 725–762. 
Eckbo, E., Makew, T., Thorburn, K., 2017. Are stock-financed takeovers opportunistic? Working 
paper 
Faccio, M., Masulis, R., 2005. The Choice of Payment Method in European Mergers and Acquisitions. 
Journal of Finance 60, 1345-1388. 
Fama, E., French, K., 1993. Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds. Journal of 
Financial Economics 33, 3–56. 
Fama, E., French, K., 2015. A five-factor asset pricing model. Journal of Financial Economics 116, 1-
22. 
  
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
47 
 
Fishman, M., 1989. Preemptive Bidding and the Role of the Medium of Exchange in Acquisitions. 
Journal of Finance 44, 41-57. 
Fu, F., Lin, L., Officer, M., 2013. Acquisitions driven by stock overvaluation: are they good deals? 
Journal of Financial Economics 109, 24–39. 
Golubov, A., Petmezas, D., Travlos, N., 2016. Do Stock-Financed Acquisitions Destroy Value? New 
Methods and Evidence. Review of Finance 20, 161-200. 
Healy, P., Palepu, K., Ruback, R., 1992. Does corporate performance improve after mergers? Journal 
of Financial Economics 31, 135-175. 
Malmendier, U., Tate, G., 2008. Who makes acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and the market's 
reaction. Journal of Financial Economics 89, 20-43. 
Mitchell, M., Pulvino, T., 2001. Characteristics of Risk and Return in Risk Arbitrage. Journal of Finance 
6, 2135-2175. 
Loughran, T., Vijh, A. M., 1997. Do long-term shareholders benefit from corporate acquisitions? 
Journal of Finance 52, 1765–1790. 
Myers, S., Majluf, N., 1984. Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have 
information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics 13, 187-221. 
Nguyen, G., Swanston, P., 2009. Firm Characteristics, Relative Efficiency, and Equity Returns. Journal 
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 44, 213-236. 
Petersen, M., 2009. Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing Approaches. 
The Review of Financial Studies 22, 435-480. 
Pinkowitz, L., Sturgess, J., Williamson, R. 2013. Do cash stockpiles fuel cash acquisitions, Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 23, 128-149 
Rau, P. R., Vermaelen, T., 1998. Glamour, value and the post-acquisition performance of acquiring 
firms. Journal of Financial Economics 49, 223–253. 
  
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
48 
 
Rhodes-Kropf, M., Robinson, D. T., Viswanathan, S., 2005. Valuation waves and merger activity: the 
empirical evidence. Journal of Financial Economics 77, 561–603. 
Ritter, J.,  Welch, I., 2002. A Review of IPO Activity, Pricing, and Allocations. Journal of Finance 57, 
1795-1828.  
Roberts, M., Whited, T., 2012. Endogeneity in empirical corporate finance. Unpublished Working 
paper. Simon Business School. 
Rosen, R., 2006. Merger momentum and investor sentiment: the stock market reaction to merger 
announcements. Journal of Business 79, 987–1017. 
Savor, P.. Lu, Q., 2009. Do stock mergers create value for acquirers? Journal of Finance 64, 1061–
1097. 
Schwert, W., 1996. Markup pricing in mergers and acquisitions. Journal of Financial Economics 41, 
153-192. 
Servaes, H., 1992. Tobin's Q and the Gains from Takeovers. Journal of Finance 46, 409–419. 
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R. W., 2003. Stock market driven acquisitions. Journal of Financial Economics 70, 
295–311. 
Travlos, N. G., 1987. Corporate takeover bids, methods of payment, and bidding firms stock returns. 
Journal of Finance 42, 943–963. 
Uysal, V., 2011. Deviation from the target capital structure and acquisition choices, Journal of 
Financial Economics 102, 602-620. 
Vermaelen, T., Xu, M., 2014. Acquisition finance and market timing, Journal of Corporate Finance 25, 
73-91 
 
 
 
 
  
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
49 
 
Figure 1. The Difference-in-Differences Framework 
This figure is a graphical representation of the difference-in-differences estimator for acquirers that 
take advantage of relative misvaluations (High RM) versus those that do not (Low RM). The control 
group is a cash acquisitions subsample selected using a Mahalanobis matching methodology. The 
difference between high and low in the cash group captures any non-valuation related effects. 
Distance A1 depicts that effect. The treatment group is the stock acquisitions subsample. The 
difference between high and low for stock acquisitions (distance A3) captures both valuation and 
non-valuation related effects. If the impact of non-valuation related effects is captured by the cash 
subsample (distance A1), the relative misvaluation benefit for stock acquirers is the difference of A3 
minus A1 (distance A2). 
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Table 1. Time Series Distribution of Takeovers 
This table shows the time series distribution of takeovers by year for the overall sample for stock and for cash 
acquirers. The summary statistics are provided for 1,954 acquisitions from 1985 to 2016. A deal is classified as 
stock (cash) if it is 100% financed with equity (cash). 
 
 
All Stock Cash 
1985 21 7 14 
1986 27 7 20 
1987 14 8 6 
1988 38 17 21 
1989 37 20 17 
1990 25 17 8 
1991 36 31 5 
1992 39 31 8 
1993 47 36 11 
1994 98 72 26 
1995 123 98 25 
1996 125 100 25 
1997 182 146 36 
1998 192 157 35 
1999 182 144 38 
2000 157 119 38 
2001 114 80 34 
2002 60 32 28 
2003 72 37 35 
2004 84 41 43 
2005 70 35 35 
2006 77 26 51 
2007 76 18 58 
2008 42 16 26 
2009 34 20 14 
2010 56 21 35 
2011 33 12 21 
2012 49 17 32 
2013 51 18 33 
2014 52 22 30 
2015 70 28 42 
2016 69 23 46 
Total 2352 1456 896 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics on the Misvaluation Measure 
 
This table presents the median values for the different components of the decomposition methodology as 
proposed by Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005). Misvaluation is measured either 42 days prior to the acquisition or 
one day before the announcement date. Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) decompose the market-to-book value ratio 
into two components: the misvaluation component and the long-run investment opportunities component: 
  (
 
 
)    (
 
 
)    (
 
 
) 
 
  
Bidder Target Bidder-Stock Bidder-Cash Target-Stock Target-Cash 
  (
 
 
)           0.590 -0.013 0.704 0.462 0.112 -0.180 
  (
 
 
)         0.649 0.066 0.764 0.483 0.227 -0.121 
  (
 
 
)           0.852 0.612 0.919 0.767 0.622 0.606 
  (
 
 
)         0.900 0.700 0.980 0.784 0.716 0.691 
  (
 
 
)           0.287 0.644 0.255 0.330 0.542 0.752 
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Table 3. The Difference-in-Differences Univariate Approach for Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns 
(BHARs) 
 
This table presents the Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) for the holding periods of 12, 24, 36 and 60 
months after the announcement of the acquisition. BHARs are calculated as:   
             ∏ (      )
 
    ∏         
 
    
Where             is the buy-and-hold abnormal returns for acquirer i from time t=0, which is the month of 
the acquisition announcement to month T, T is the holding period,      is the monthly return for acquirer i in 
month t and      is the Datastream value-weighted market index for the US market. Stock denotes 100% 
equity-financed acquisitions and cash denotes 100% cash-financed acquisitions. Acquisitions are classified as 
High (Low) RM if the Relative misvaluation measure (RM) is higher (lower) than the first quartile of the positive 
values of RM. The Relative Misvaluation measure is estimated as:       (
 
 
)
      
   (
 
 
)
      
 
Where RM is the relative misvaluation of a takeover,   (
 
 
)
      
 is bidder’s misvaluation and   (
 
 
)
      
 is 
target’s misvaluation 42 days before the acquisition announcement. The   (
 
 
)
      
 and   (
 
 
)
      
 are 
components of the decomposition of the market-to-book ratio of the bidder and target. The Dif (High-Low RM) 
denotes the difference in performance between high and low RM portfolios, the Dif(Stock-Cash) denotes the 
difference in performance between stock and cash portfolios and the Dif-in-Difs denotes the difference-in-
differences between stock and cash acquisitions. All acquirers and targets are publicly traded firms listed on 
the major US markets. The superscripts ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 
BHARs12 BHARs24 
 
Stock Cash Dif(Stock-
Cash) 
Stock Cash Dif(Stock-
Cash) High RM -5.18%** 1.96% -7.14%** -
11.13%*** 
-0.20% -10.94%** 
Low RM -9.50%*** 3.19% -12.69%*** -
16.12%*** 
9.35%*** -25.47%*** 
   
Dif-in-Difs    Dif-in-Difs 
Dif (High-Low 
RM) 
4.32% -1.23% 5.55% 4.99% -9.55%** 14.54%* 
 BHARs36 BHARs60 
 Stock Cash Dif(Stock-
Cash) 
Stock Cash Dif(Stock-
Cash) High RM -9.97%** 1.76% -11.73%* -10.61% -1.14% -9.46% 
Low RM -
20.37%*** 
12.78%**
* 
-33.15%*** -
20.96%*** 
16.96%** -37.92%*** 
   Dif-in-Difs    Dif-in-Difs 
Dif (High-Low 
RM) 
10.40%* -11.02%* 21.42%** 10.36% -
18.10%** 
28.46%** 
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Table 4. The Difference-in-Differences Multivariate Approach for Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns 
(BHARs) 
This table presents the Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) for the holding periods of 12, 24, 36 and 60 
months after the announcement of the acquisition. BHARs is the dependent variable. Stock is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if the deal is 100% financed with equity. High is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one if the relative misvaluation (RM) of the deal is higher than the first quartile of the 
positive values of the RM measure. Stock*High is the interactive term between the Stock and High dummy 
variables. The rest of the control variables are described in the Appendix, Panel A. BHARs and RM are 
estimated as discussed in the description of Table 3. All acquirers and targets are publicly traded firms listed on 
the major US markets. The superscripts ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. In regressions (2), (4), (6) and (8), we control for year and industry fixed effects. Standard 
errors are clustered by industry and year. N denotes the number of observations. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 BHARs12 BHARs12 BHARs24 BHARs24 BHARs36 BHARs36 BHARs60 BHARs60 
Stock -0.090** -0.078* -
0.240**
* 
-
0.182**
* 
-
0.368**
* 
-
0.276**
* 
-
0.507**
* 
-0.430*** 
High -0.007 -0.005 -0.102* -0.100** -0.157** -0.157** -0.213** -0.228*** 
Stock*High 0.095* 0.081* 0.211**
* 
0.178**
* 
0.317**
* 
0.253**
* 
0.421**
* 
0.366*** 
Cash/TA 0.099 0.130 0.101 0.115 0.468 0.521 0.338 0.611 
Return on Equity -0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Sales Growth -
0.311**
* 
-
0.263**
* 
-0.378** -0.263* -0.383** -0.259 -0.229 -0.172 
Debt/Equity(-1)-
Bid 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PE(-42days)-Bid -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
Log(TA) 0.015 -0.004 0.045* -0.025 0.058 -0.048 -0.043 -0.120** 
BHARs(-12,-1) -0.005 -0.016 -
0.053**
* 
-
0.069**
* 
-
0.097**
* 
-
0.102**
* 
-
0.113**
* 
-0.110*** 
St.Dev.(-253,-42)-
Bid 
-0.619 -
4.441**
* 
1.755 -
5.626**
* 
2.165 -
8.874**
* 
-0.456 -
12.617**
* 
Relative Size 0.042 0.051 0.052 0.057 0.100 0.123* 0.072 0.100 
MTBV(-42 days)-
Bid 
-0.007 -0.007 -0.010 -0.009 -0.003 -0.002 -0.015 -0.017 
Hostile 0.099 0.056 0.002 0.078 -0.071 0.067 -0.588* -0.403* 
Tender Offer 0.027 0.013 -0.077 -0.076* -0.135** -0.094* -
0.262**
* 
-0.220*** 
TarTerm -0.000 0.026 -0.043 -0.006 -0.060 -0.038 0.043 0.001 
BidLock -0.054 -0.023 -0.088 -0.001 0.022 0.015 0.123 0.079 
NoDealsinYear -0.017 -0.018 -0.013 0.002 -0.063 -0.070* 0.033 -0.061* 
Constant -0.025 0.208 -0.146 0.203 -0.187 0.623* 0.487 1.093** 
Industry FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
N 1671 1671 1615 1615 1557 1557 1469 1469 
adj. R-sq 0.021 0.060 0.029 0.113 0.022 0.101 0.013 0.099 
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Table 5. Cash Acquirers Matched with Stock Acquirers on the Basis of Relative Misvaluation and 
Bidder Misvaluation. The Difference-in-Differences Multivariate Approach for Buy-and-Hold 
Abnormal Returns (BHARs) 
 
This table presents the Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) for the holding periods of 12, 24, 36 and 60 
months following the announcement of the acquisition. BHARs is the dependent variable. Stock is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if the deal is 100% financed with equity. High is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one if the relative misvaluation (RM) of the deal is higher than the first quartile of the 
positive values of the RM measure. Stock*High is the interactive term between the Stock and High dummy 
variables. The rest of the control variables are described in the Appendix, Panel A. Cash acquirers are matched 
with stock acquirers through a minimum distance Mahalanobis technique based on the Relative Misvaluation 
(RM) measure (Panel A) and also based on the Relative Misvaluation (RM) measure and Bidder Misvaluation 
(Panel B). BHARs and RM are estimated as discussed in the description of Table 3. All acquirers and targets are 
publicly traded firms listed on the major US markets. The superscripts ***, ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. In all regressions, we control for year and industry fixed 
effects. Standard errors are clustered by industry and year. N denotes the number of observations. 
 
Panlel A: Mahalanobis 1 to 1: Matched on 
Relative Misvaluation 
Panel B: Mahalanobis 1 to 1: Matched on Relative 
Misvaluation & Acquirer Misvaluation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
BHARs1
2 
BHARs2
4 
BHARs3
6 
BHARs6
0 
BHARs12 BHARs24 BHARs36 BHARs60 
Stock -0.094* -
0.234*
** 
-
0.351*
** 
-
0.458*
** 
0.003 -0.090 -0.173** -0.355*** 
High -0.052 -
0.163*
* 
-
0.252*
* 
-
0.362*
** 
0.073* -0.033 -0.099 -0.120 
Stock*High 0.138*
* 
.238
 
.340
** 
.495
 
0.009 0.116* 0.194** 0.259** 
Cash/TA 0.076 -0.049 0.334 0.254 0.192* 0.098 0.509* 0.234 
Return on 
Equity 
-0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 
Sales Growth -
0.263*
** 
-0.237* -0.233 -0.067 -0.351*** -0.391** -0.420** -0.265 
Debt/Equity(
-1)-Bid 
-0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
PE(-42days)-
Bid 
-0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
Log(TA) -0.003 -0.035 -0.063 -
0.168*
** 
-0.000 0.002 -0.033 -0.179** 
BHARs(-12,-
1) 
-0.014 -
0.061*
** 
-
0.098*
** 
-
0.101*
* 
-0.013 -0.053*** -0.097*** -0.068 
St.Dev.(-
253,-42)-Bid 
-
4.933*
** 
-
5.674*
* 
-
8.123*
** 
-
13.017
*** 
-5.222*** -6.547*** -10.334*** -14.496*** 
Relative Size 0.088 0.037 0.097 0.079 0.041 0.060 0.110 0.061 
MTBV(-42 
days)-Bid 
-0.005 -0.006 0.000 -0.010 -0.009** -0.010 -0.003 -0.016 
Hostile -
0.255*
** 
-
0.436*
** 
-
0.626*
** 
-
0.427*
* 
-0.137 -0.357* -0.305* -0.078 
Tender Offer 0.043 -0.079 -0.094 -0.1 8 0.028 -0.047 -0.110 -0.307*** 
TarTerm 0.004 -0.059 -0.093 -0.092 -0.006 -0.052 -0.098 -0.049 
BidLock -0.061 -0.017 -0.002 0.107 -0.037 -0.028 -0.005 0.109 
NoDealsinYe
ar 
-0.022 -0.018 -
0.094*
* 
-
0.078*
* 
-0.035 -0.023 -0.109** -0.064 
Constant 0.191 0.196 0.552 1.24
** 
0.235 -0.014 0.588 1.444*** 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1995 1929 1863 1743 2005 1939 1870 1755 
adj. R-sq 0.083 0.150 0.132 0.113 0.095 0.159 0.147 0.105 
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Table 6. Cash Acquirers Matched with Stock Acquirers on the Basis of All Variables. The Difference-
in-Differences Multivariate Approach for Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) 
 
This table presents the Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) for the holding periods of 12, 24, 36 and 60 
months following the announcement of the acquisition. BHARs is the dependent variable. Stock is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if the deal is 100% financed with equity. High is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one if the relative misvaluation (RM) of the deal is higher than the first quartile of the 
positive values of the RM measure. Stock*High is the interactive term between the Stock and High dummy 
variables. The rest of the control variables are described in the Appendix, Panel A. Cash acquirers are matched 
with stock acquirers through a minimum distance Mahalanobis technique based on all variables as described in 
the Appendix, Panel C. In Panels A, B and C, one stock acquirer is matched with one, five or ten cash acquirers, 
respectively. BHARs and RM are estimated as discussed in the description of Table 3. All acquirers and targets 
are publicly traded firms listed on the major US markets. The superscripts ***, ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. In all regressions, we control for year and industry fixed 
effects. Standard errors are clustered by industry and year. N denotes the number of observations. 
 
Panel A: Mahalanobis 1 to 1 Panel B: Mahalanobis 1 to 5 Panel C: Mahalanobis 1 to 10 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
BHAR
s12 
BHAR
s24 
BHARs
36 
BHARs
60 
BHAR
s12 
BHAR
s24 
BHARs
36 
BHARs
60 
BHAR
s12 
BHAR
s24 
BHARs
36 
BHARs
60 
Stock -
0.032 
-
0.121
** 
-
0.178
** 
-
0.259
** 
-
0.061
* 
-
0.136
*** 
-
0.181
** 
-
0.244
*** 
-
0.058
* 
-
0.128
** 
-
0.174
** 
-
0.223
** 
High 0.075 0.009 -0.061 -0.077 0.049 -
0.041 
-0.070 -0.056 0.048 -
0.044 
-0.066 -0.071 
Stock*High -
0.003 
0.093 0.177
* 
0.232
* 
0.034 0.135
** 
0.173
** 
0.218
* 
0.028 0.127
* 
0.154
* 
0.217
* Cash/TA 0.078 0.079 0.458 0.582 -
0.002 
-
0.147 
0.163 0.093 -
0.010 
-
0.112 
0.115 0.049 
Return on 
Equity 
-
0.000 
0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 
Sales 
Growth 
-
0.280
*** 
-
0.274 
-0.225 -0.106 -
0.158 
-
0.070 
0.101 0.172 -
0.085 
0.069 0.249 0.325 
Debt/Equity
(-1)-Bid 
-
0.000 
-
0.000 
0.000 0.000 -
0.000 
-
0.000 
-0.000 0.000 -
0.000 
-
0.000 
-0.000 0.000 
PE(-
42days)-Bid 
-
0.000 
-
0.000 
0.000 -0.000 -
0.000 
-
0.000 
0.000 -0.000 -
0.000 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log(TA) -
0.034 
-
0.069
** 
-
0.081
** 
-
0.158
** 
-
0.028 
-
0.044 
-0.046 -
0.168
*** 
-
0.031 
-
0.028 
-0.024 -
0.162
** 
BHARs(-12,-
1) 
-
0.015 
-
0.058
*** 
-
0.099
*** 
-0.071 -
0.009 
-
0.037 
-
0.104
*** 
-0.049 -
0.006 
-
0.030 
-
0.102
*** 
-0.047 
St.Dev.(-
253,-42)-Bid 
-
4.726
*** 
-
8.695
*** 
-
11.63
4*** 
-
16.70
1*** 
-
4.644
*** 
-
9.029
*** 
-
10.77
8*** 
-
17.97
2*** 
-
4.461
*** 
-
9.373
*** 
-
10.86
2*** 
-
19.50
5*** 
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Relative 
Size 
0.024 0.075 0.130 0.092 0.075 0.061 0.074 0.042 0.069 0.050 0.057 0.031 
MTBV(-42 
days)-Bid 
-
0.006 
-
0.008 
-0.002 -0.019 -
0.005 
-
0.004 
-0.004 -0.021 -
0.007 
-
0.003 
-0.006 -0.025 
Hostile 0.144 -
0.008 
0.034 -0.439 0.020 -
0.225 
-0.302 -0.466 -
0.024 
-
0.278 
-
0.431
** 
-0.395 
Tender 
Offer 
-
0.055 
-
0.075 
-0.080 -0.116 -
0.060
* 
-
0.072 
-0.092 -
0.167
* 
-
0.059
** 
-
0.066 
-0.095 -
0.168
* 
TarTerm 0.038 0.017 -0.033 -0.066 -
0.005 
-
0.068 
-0.103 -0.129 -
0.017 
-
0.082 
-
0.127
* 
-0.134 
BidLock 0.001 0.030 0.030 0.077 0.021 0.074 0.132
* 
0.181
* 
0.013 0.088 0.154
* 
0.163 
NoDealsinY
ear 
-
0.010 
0.010 -0.061 -
0.063
* 
-
0.022 
-
0.035 
-0.102 -0.070 -
0.024 
-
0.030 
-0.072 -0.037 
Constant 0.552
*** 
0.623
** 
0.988
*** 
1.272
*** 
0.490
*** 
0.713
** 
1.043
*** 
1.967
*** 
0.444
** 
0.562
** 
0.852
** 
1.868
*** Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2002 1964 1901 1787 6011 5839 5622 5262 1102
5 
1067
6 
10248 9515 
adj. R-sq 0.080 0.148 0.112 0.103 0.166 0.222 0.194 0.180 0.185 0.253 0.235 0.229 
 
Table 7. Intensified Measure of Relative Misvaluation. The Difference-in-Differences Multivariate 
Approach for Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) 
 
This table presents the Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) for the holding periods of 12, 24, 36 and 60 
months following the announcement of the acquisition. BHARs is the dependent variable. Stock is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if the deal is 100% financed with equity. In Panel A, High is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if the relative misvaluation (RM) of the deal is higher than the median of 
the positive values of the RM measure. In Panel B, High is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the 
relative misvaluation (RM) of the deal belongs in the top quartile of the positive values of the RM measure. 
Stock*High is the interactive term between the Stock and High dummy variables. The rest of the control 
variables are described in the Appendix, Panel A. Cash acquirers are matched with stock acquirers through a 
minimum distance Mahalanobis technique based on all variables as described in the Appendix, Panel C. BHARs 
and RM are estimated as discussed in the description of Table 3. All acquirers and targets are publicly traded 
firms listed on the major US markets. The superscripts ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively. In all regressions, we control for year and industry fixed effects. Standard 
errors are clustered by industry and year. N denotes the number of observations. 
 
Panel A: RM 50% or higher Panel B: RM 75% or higher 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
BHARs12 BHARs24 BHARs36 BHARs60 BHARs12 BHARs24 BHARs36 BHARs60 
Stock -0.042 -0.132** -0.220*** -0.301*** -0.038 -0.145*** -0.211*** -0.335*** 
High 0.031 -0.005 -0.116 -0.072 0.026 0.028 -0.132 0.046 
Stock*High 0.063 0.137* 0.296** 0.289* 0.158 0.189* 0.370** 0.458* 
Cash/TA 0.182 0.254 0.729** 0.813 0.332* 0.504** 0.875** 1.192 
Return on Equity -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 
Sales Growth -0.250** -0.146 -0.145 -0.054 -0.202 -0.038 0.081 0.214 
Debt/Equity(-1)-
Bid 
-0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
PE(-42days)-Bid -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
Log(TA) -0.031 -0.055 -0.045 -0.129 -0.022 -0.048 -0.032 -0.168* 
BHARs(-12,-1) -0.009 -0.053** -0.108*** -0.075 0.000 -0.036 -0.109** -0.035 
St.Dev.(-253,-42)-
Bid 
-
5.090*** 
-
9.044*** 
-
12.302**
* 
-
15.592**
* 
-
7.552*** 
-
13.137**
* 
-
16.775**
* 
-
24.922**
* 
Relative Size 0.013 0.093* 0.162** 0.123 -0.011 0.047 0.113 0.129 
MTBV(-42 days)-
Bid 
-0.010* -0.008 -0.002 -0.020* -0.013** -0.018* -0.020** -0.036** 
Hostile 0.205 0.097 0.169 -0.277 0.288 0.659 0.674 0.049 
Tender Offer -0.060 -0.052 -0.115 -0.192* -0.033 -0.096 -0.154 -0.344** 
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TarTerm 0.001 -0.043 -0.066 -0.102 0.022 0.016 -0.014 0.042 
BidLock 0.027 0.086 0.042 0.117 0.021 0.085 0.092 0.249* 
NoDealsinYear -0.041 -0.018 -0.105** -0.078** -0.014 -0.012 -0.115 -0.079 
Constant 0.603*** 0.596** 0.940** 1.211** 0.599*** 0.849** 1.017** 1.728** 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1544 1511 1458 1366 1166 1138 1090 1023 
adj. R-sq 0.077 0.188 0.116 0.107 0.093 0.201 0.166 0.110 
 
 
 
 
Table 8. The Difference-in-Differences Univariate Approach for Target Premium 
 
This table presents the target premium received by using two measures. We estimate target firms’ cumulative 
abnormal returns around the acquisition announcement date as: 
                    ∑      
 
   
      
Where Target CARs(-t,+T) is target cumulative abnormal returns from t1 days before the announcement of the 
deal up to T days after the announcement, Ri,t is the target firm’s return on day t and Rm,t is the Datastream 
value-weighted market index for the US market. Target cumulative abnormal returns are estimated for the 
period 42 days prior to the acquisition date up to the completion day (CD) [Target CARs(-42,+CD)]. Results are 
presented in Panel A. We also estimate target cumulative abnormal returns for the period one day prior to the 
acquisition date up to one day after the announcement [Target CARs(-1,+1)]. Results are presented in Panel B. 
Stock denotes 100% equity-financed acquisitions, cash denotes 100% cash-financed acquisitions and All 
denotes both stock and cash acquisitions. Acquisitions are classified as High (Low) RM as described in Table 3. 
Cash acquirers are matched with stock acquirers through a minimum distance Mahalanobis technique based 
on all variables as described in Appendix, Panel C. 
 The Dif (High-Low RM) denotes the difference in performance between high and low RM portfolios and the 
Dif-in-Difs denotes the difference-in-differences between stock and cash acquisitions. All acquirers and targets 
are publicly traded firms listed on the major US markets. The superscripts ***, ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Target CARs(-42,CD) 
 
Panel B: Target CARs(-1,+1) 
 
 
All Stock Cash 
 
All Stock Cash 
 High RM 41.94%*
** 
37.85%*
** 
46.03%*
** 
27.13%*
** 
20.09%*
** 
34.16%*
** Low RM 23.42%*
** 
21.92%*
** 
24.91%*
** 
 16.87%*
** 
14.42%*
** 
19.31%*
** 
 
    Dif-in-
Difs 
   Dif-in-
Difs Dif (High-Low 
RM) 
18.52%*
** 
15.93%*
** 
21.12%*
** 
-5.20% 10.26%*
** 
5.67%**
* 
14.85%*
** 
-
9.17%**
* 
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Table 9. The Difference-in-Differences Multivariate Approach for Target Premiums 
 
This table presents the target premiums regression analysis results. TargetCARs(-42,CD) and TargetCARs(-1,+1), 
as described in Table 8, are the dependent variables. Stock is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if 
the deal is 100% financed with equity. High is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the relative 
misvaluation (RM) of the deal is higher than the first quartile of the positive values of the RM measure. 
Stock*High is the interactive term between the Stock and High dummy variables. The rest of the control 
variables are described in Appendix, Panel B. Cash acquirers are matched with stock acquirers through a 
minimum distance Mahalanobis technique based on all variables as described in the Appendix, Panel C. In 
Panels A, B and C, one stock acquirer is matched with one, five or ten cash acquirers, respectively. RM is 
estimated as discussed in the description of Table 3. All acquirers and targets are publicly traded firms listed on 
the major US markets. The superscripts ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. In all regressions, we control for year and industry fixed effects. Standard errors are 
clustered by industry and year. N denotes the number of observations. 
 
Panel A: Mahalanobis 1 to 1 Panel B: Mahalanobis 1 to 5 Panel C: Mahalanobis 1 to 10 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
TargetCARs(-
42,CD) 
TargetCARs(
-1,+1) 
TargetCARs(-
42,CD) 
TargetCARs(
-1,+1) 
TargetCARs(-
42,CD) 
TargetCARs(
-1,+1) 
Stock 0.016 -0.021 0.031 0.011 0.050 0.034 
High 0.029 0.033 0.042* 0.033 0.038 0.032 
Stock*High -0.038 -0.066* -0.091** -0.102*** -0.101** -0.114*** 
Ln(MV) (-42 
days)-Bid 
0.078*** 0.053*** 0.086*** 0.065*** 0.087*** 0.069*** 
Ln(MV) (-42 
days)-Tar 
-0.108*** -0.078*** -0.134*** -0.111*** -0.146*** -0.123*** 
MTBV(-42 
days)-Bid 
0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
MTBV(-42 
days)-Tar 
-0.012*** -0.006* -0.011*** -0.006 -0.008* -0.005 
Debt/Equity(-
1)-Bid 
36.909 5.642 68.680 92.415 70.601 108.314 
Debt/Equity(-
1)-Tar 
61.766 27.663 -49.352 -80.744 -81.855 -100.048 
Operating 
ROA-Bid 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Operating 
ROA-Tar 
0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
BH Rs(-12,-1) 0.065*** 0.006 0.032 -0.024 0.015 -0.043 
St.Dev.(-253,-
42)-Bid 
0.695 0.817 2.631 1.216 3.945* 1.832 
Hostile 0.045 0.108** 0.028 -0.009 0.158 -0.077 
Tender Offer 0.098*** 0.051* 0.027 0.026 0.027 0.030 
TarTerm 0.065** 0.059* -0.019 0.006 -0.041 -0.007 
BidLock 0.027 0.016 0.043 0.055 0.035 0.060 
NoDealsinYear -0.008 0.015 0.017 0.036 0.021 0.036 
Constant 0.008 0.207 0.060 0.270* 0.104 0.300* 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1534 1534 4659 4659 8688 8688 
adj. R-sq 0.225 0.204 0.274 0.190 0.287 0.199 
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Table 10. Cash Acquirers Matched with Stock Acquirers on the Basis of Premiums and All Other 
Variables. The Difference-in-Differences Multivariate Approach for Buy-and-Hold Abnormal 
Returns (BHARs) 
 
This table presents the Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) for the holding periods of 12, 24, 36 and 60 
months following the announcement of the acquisition. BHARs is the dependent variable. Stock is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if the deal is 100% financed with equity. High is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one if the relative misvaluation (RM) of the deal is higher than the first quartile of the 
positive values of the RM measure. Stock*High is the interactive term between the Stock and High dummy 
variables. The rest of the control variables are described in the Appendix, Panel A. Cash acquirers are matched 
with stock acquirers through a minimum distance Mahalanobis technique based on TargetCARs(-42,CD) only 
(Panel A), matched on TargetCARs(-42,CD) and all variables as described in the Appendix, Panel C (Panel B), 
matched on TargetCARs(-1,+1) only (Panel C) and matched on TargetCARs(-1,+1) and all variables as described 
in the Appendix, Panel C (Panel D). TargetCARs(-42,CD) and TargetCARs(-1,+1) are estimated as discussed in 
the description of Table 8. BHARs and RM are estimated as discussed in the description of Table 3. All acquirers 
and targets are publicly traded firms listed on the major US markets. The superscripts ***, ** and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. In all regressions, we control for year and 
industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by industry and year. N denotes the number of 
observations. 
 
Panel A: Matched on TargetCARs(-42,CD) 
only 
Panel B: Matched on TargetCARs(-42,CD) + 
Other Controls (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
BHARs1
2 
BHARs2
4 
BHARs3
6 
BHARs60 BHARs12 BHARs24 BHARs36 BHARs60 
Stock -0.064 -0.105* -0.162* -0.255* -0.028 -0.112** -0.178** -0.202* 
High -0.034 -0.084 -0.132 -0.185 0.090* 0.020 -0.066 -0.054 
Stock*High 0.104** 0.156** 0.214** 0.294** -0.009 0.082* 0.183** 0.203 
Cash/TA 0.139 0.011 0.452 0.300 0.089 0.067 0.466 0.470 
Return on Equity -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Sales Growth -
0.246**
* 
-
0.317** 
-0.260* -0.196 -0.281*** -0.250 -0.216 -0.086 
Debt/Equity(-1)-
Bid 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
PE(-42days)-Bid -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
Log(TA) 0.018 0.017 0.011 -0.096 -0.032 -0.060* -0.064* -0.164** 
BHARs(-12,-1) -0.012 -
0.065**
* 
-
0.101**
* 
-0.099** -0.015 -0.062*** -0.100*** -0.070 
St.Dev.(-253,-
42)-Bid 
-
3.631** 
-
4.210** 
-
6.895**
* 
-
10.348*
** 
-4.569*** -7.470*** -
10.515**
* 
-
16.117**
* 
Relative Size 0.013 0.049 0.083 0.014 0.051 0.042 0.099 0.030 
MTBV(-42 days)-
Bid 
-0.005 -0.004 -0.000 -0.018* -0.005 -0.007 -0.001 -0.018 
Hostile 0.060 0.184 0.125 -0.162 -0.054 -0.260 -0.245 -0.312 
Tender Offer 0.001 -0.062 -0.074 -0.162* -0.052 -0.071 -0.074 -0.140 
TarTerm 0.015 -0.024 -0.036 -0.013 0.004 -0.024 -0.103* -0.115 
BidLock -0.038 0.022 0.080 0.173 0.007 0.049 0.051 0.128 
NoDealsinYear -
0.050** 
-0.048 -
0.139** 
-0.069** -0.010 0.006 -0.074* -0.049 
Constant -0.014 -0.506 -0.157 0.313 0.542*** 0.610** 0.822*** 1.274** 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2012 1950 1899 1772 2008 1961 1906 1795 
adj. R-sq 0.064 0.121 0.118 0.100 0.080 0.138 0.106 0.098 
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Panel C: Matched on TargetCARs(-1,+1) 
only 
Panel D: Matched on TargetCARs(-1,+1) + Other 
Controls (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
 
BHARs1
2 
BHARs2
4 
BHARs3
6 
BHARs60 BHARs12 BHARs24 BHARs36 BHARs60 
Stock -0.009 -0.086 -
0.174** 
-
0.335**
* 
-0.052 -0.132** -0.172** -0.248** 
High 0.032 -0.030 -0.089 -0.172 0.086* 0.026 -0.013 -0.042 
Stock*High 0.047 0.108 0.197* 0.299** -0.005 0.071 0.127* 0.197* 
Cash/TA 0.019 -0.014 0.340 0.310 0.004 -0.057 0.379 0.435 
Return on Equity -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Sales Growth -
0.207** 
-0.177 -0.112 -0.093 -0.273** -0.235 -0.221 -0.106 
Debt/Equity(-1)-
Bid 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
PE(-42days)-Bid -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
Log(TA) -0.014 -0.005 -0.015 -0.073 -0.042* -0.072** -0.078* -0.171*** 
BHARs(-12,-1) -0.007 -
0.058**
* 
-
0.076**
* 
-0.087* -0.017 -0.063*** -0.099*** -0.069 
St.Dev.(-253,-
42)-Bid 
-
4.431**
* 
-
4.310** 
-
8.501**
* 
-9.387** -4.259*** -7.103*** -
10.486**
* 
-
15.128**
* 
Relative Size 0.068 0.073 0.146** 0.076 0.042 0.045 0.089 0.038 
MTBV(-42 days)-
Bid 
-0.010* -0.012 -0.004 -0.016 -0.005 -0.006 -0.002 -0.020 
Hostile 0.573 0.979 1.014 -0.427 -0.075 -0.286 -0.301 -0.323 
Tender Offer 0.062 -0.058 -0.144* -
0.283**
* 
-0.038 -0.053 -0.097 -0.124 
TarTerm -0.007 -0.030 -0.015 -0.037 0.010 -0.000 -0.050 -0.059 
BidLock 0.012 0.024 0.077 0.125 0.007 0.042 0.029 0.100 
NoDealsinYear -0.026 -0.005 -
0.081** 
-0.075 -0.016 0.000 -0.074 -0.050 
Constant 0.015 -0.482 -0.066 0.259 0.557*** 0.500* 0.950*** 1.493*** 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2017 1932 1874 1763 2005 1963 1903 1784 
adj. R-sq 0.102 0.153 0.129 0.121 0.089 0.146 0.102 0.097 
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Table 11. The Difference-in-Differences Univariate Approach for Acquirers’ Operating Performance 
This table presents the operating performance of takeovers. The constant (α) of the following regression is 
reported for each portfolio: 
                                         
                 is the pre-acquisition abnormal performance, which is estimated as the median value of 
the abnormal performance in the pre-merger years (-3 to -1).                   is the post-acquisition 
abnormal performance, which is estimated as the median value of the abnormal performance in the post-
acquisition years (+1 to +5). In the period prior to the acquisition, performance is calculated as the market 
value weighted average of the target’s and acquiring firm’s performance. We also calculate the industry 
median performance of the acquirer’s and the target’s industry, and a market value weighted average is 
estimated. Abnormal performance is estimated as the difference between the market value weighted average 
of the bidder and target performance and the market value weighted average of the bidder and target industry 
performance. The post-acquisition abnormal performance is calculated in the same way, but for the acquiring 
firm only. The main measure of operating performance is Earnings Before Interest Taxes and Depreciation 
(EBITDA) divided by total assets. The measure of Operating Return on Assets (ROA) is decomposed into 
Operating Profit Margin, calculated as EBITDA divided by sales, and asset turnover calculated as sales divided 
by assets. 
              
      
      
 
      
     
 
     
      
 
Stock denotes 100% equity-financed acquisitions and cash denotes 100% cash-financed acquisitions. 
Acquisitions are classified as High (Low) RM as described in Table 3. Cash acquirers are matched with stock 
acquirers through a minimum distance Mahalanobis technique based on all variables as described in the 
Appendix, Panel C.  The Dif (High-Low RM) denotes the difference in performance between high and low RM 
portfolios and the Dif-in-Difs denotes the difference between stock and cash acquisitions of their differences 
between high and low RM deals. All acquirers and targets are publicly traded firms listed on the major US 
markets. The superscripts ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
EBITDA/Assets EBITDA/Sales Sales/Assets 
Panel A: Mahalanobis 1 to 1 
High RM -
0.012*
* 
-
0.013**
* 
 -
0.01
3 
-
0.017**
* 
 -
0.03
6 
-
0.047**
* 
 
Low RM -
0.010*
* 
-
0.012**
* 
 
2
0.005  -
0.02
0 
-
0.127**
* 
 
 
  Dif-in-
Difs 
  Dif-in-
Difs 
  Dif-in-
Difs Dif (High-Low 
RM) 
-0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -
0.02
5 
-0.022 -0.003 -
0.01
6 
0.080 -0.096 
Panel B: Mahalanobis 1 to 5 
High RM -
0.012*
* 
-
0.009**
* 
 -
0.01
3 
-
0.008**
* 
 -
0.03
6 
-
0.038**
* 
 
Low RM -
0.010*
* 
-
0.018**
* 
 
2
- . 03  -
0.02
0 
-
0.111**
* 
 
 
         
Dif (High-Low 
RM) 
-0.002 0.009 -0.011 -
0.02
5 
-0.005 -0.020 -
0.01
6 
0.073 -0.089 
Panel C: Mahalanobis 1 to 10 
High RM -
0.012*
* 
-
0.008**
* 
 -
0.01
3 
-
0.007**
* 
 -
0.03
6 
-
0.027**
* 
 
Low RM -
0.010*
* 
-
0.021**
* 
 
2
-
0.005** 
 -
0.02
0 
-
0.106**
* 
 
 
         
Dif (High-Low 
RM) 
-0.002 0.013 -0.015 -
0.02
5 
-0.002 -0.023 -
0.01
6 
0.079 -0.095 
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Table 12. The Fama-French Five Factors Model: The Difference-in-Differences Multivariate 
Approach for Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) 
This table presents the Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) for the holding periods of 12, 24, 36 and 60 
months after the announcement of the acquisition. BHARs is the dependent variable. Stock is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if the deal is 100% financed with equity. High is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one if the relative misvaluation (RM) of the deal is negative. Stock*High is the interactive 
term between the Stock and High dummy variables. The rest of the control variables are described in the 
Appendix, Panel A. 
The Relative Misvaluation measure is estimated as:                     
The alphas (α) for bidder and target firms are estimated with the following Fama-French (2015) five factor 
model: 
               (         )                                   
Where    is bidders’ and targets’ monthly returns respectively for a period of 36 months prior to the 
acquisition announcement,    is the risk-free rate of return, (         ) is the market premium,      is the 
Small-minus-Big factor,      is the High-minus-Low factor,      is robust-minus-weak profitability factor 
and      is the low-minus-high investment factor. All factors have been obtained from Kenneth French’s 
website. A negative (positive) alpha would indicate overvaluation (undervaluation). BHARs and RM are 
estimated as discussed in the description of Table 3. 
In models (2) and (3), cash acquirers are matched with stock acquirers through a minimum distance 
Mahalanobis technique based on the Relative Misvaluation (RM) measure (model 2) and also based on the 
Relative Misvaluation (RM) measure and Bidder Misvaluation (model 3) respectively. In models (4), (5) and (6), 
cash acquirers are matched with stock acquirers through a minimum distance Mahalanobis technique based 
on all variables as described in the Appendix. One stock acquirer is matched with one, five or ten cash 
acquirers, respectively. In model (7), High is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the relative 
misvaluation (RM) of the deal is lower than the median of the negative values of the RM measure. In model 
(8), High is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the relative misvaluation (RM) of the deal belongs 
in the bottom quartile of the negative values of the RM measure. 
In model (9), cash acquirers are matched with stock acquirers through a minimum distance Mahalanobis 
technique based on TargetCARs(-42,CD) and all variables as described in the Appendix, Panel C. In model (10), 
the matching takes place on TargetCARs(-1,+1) and all variables as described in the Appendix, Panel C. 
TargetCARs(-42,CD) and TargetCARs(-1,+1) are estimated as discussed in the description of Table 8. 
All acquirers and targets are publicly traded firms listed on the major US markets. The superscripts ***, ** and 
* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. In all regressions, we control for 
year and industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by industry and year. N denotes the number of 
observations. 
 
All 
RelMi
s 
RelMis+Bi
dMis 
1 to 1 1 to 5 
1 to 
10 
50% 75% T42+ T11+ 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
BHARs
36 
BHARs
36 
BHARs36 
BHARs
36 
BHARs
36 
BHARs
36 
BHARs
36 
BHARs
36 
BHARs
36 
BHARs
36 
Stock 
-
0.358
*** 
-
0.312
*** 
-
0.339*** 
-
0.276
*** 
-
0.322
*** 
-
0.304
*** 
-
0.127*
* 
-
0.116*
* 
-
0.275
** 
-
0.273
** 
High -0.102 -0.104 -0.160** -0.058 
-
0.135
* 
-
0.112
* 
0.062 -0.037 -0.099 -0.071 
Stock*High 0.349
*** 
0.329
** 
0.378*** 
0.280
*** 
0.349
*** 
0.327
*** 
0.208*
* 
0.481*
* 
0.322
*** 
0.292
*** 
Cash/TA 0.478 0.196 0.332 0.411 -0.015 -0.126 0.348 0.341 0.461 0.358 
Return on 
Equity 
0.001
* 
0.002
* 
0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Sales Growth -0.177 -0.233 -0.219 -0.210 0.036 0.157 -0.091 -0.142 -0.192 -0.243 
Debt/Equity(- -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
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1)-Bid 
PE(-42days)-
Bid 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log(TA) -0.017 0.010 -0.046 -0.050 -0.006 0.013 -0.057 -0.060 -0.075 -0.078 
BHARs(-12,-
1) 
-
0.108
*** 
-
0.089
*** 
-
0.078*** 
-
0.076
*** 
-0.073 -0.055 
-
0.071*
** 
-
0.067*
** 
-
0.088
*** 
-
0.065
*** 
St.Dev.(-253,-
42)-Bid 
-
1.175
*** 
-
6.015
** 
-
8.079*** 
-
8.615
*** 
-
8.268
** 
-7.865 
-
10.100
*** 
-
10.433
*** 
-
8.971
*** 
-
9.440
*** 
Relative Size 0.083 
0.137
* 
0.105 0.128 0.061 0.049 0.096 0.110 0.069 0.114 
MTBV(-42 
days)-Bid 
-0.003 -0.009 -0.001 -0.005 -0.011 -0.015 -0.005 -0.002 -0.007 -0.006 
Hostile 0.271 0.141 0.823 
-
0.479
** 
0.089 0.310 0.072 
-
0.389*
* 
-0.229 
-
0.421
** 
Tender Offer 
-
0.130
** 
-0.133 -0.053 
-
0.143
* 
-
0.144
* 
-
0.154
* 
-
0.160*
* 
-0.115 -0.059 
-
0.139
* 
TarTerm -0.015 -0.079 0.012 -0.001 -0.048 -0.060 -0.034 -0.030 -0.012 -0.043 
BidLock -0.011 -0.028 -0.058 -0.059 0.098 
0.173
* 
-0.009 0.003 -0.012 -0.035 
NoDealsinYea
r 
-0.054 
-
0.114
** 
-0.071 -0.058 
-
0.129
* 
-
0.144
* 
-0.047 -0.046 
-
0.079
* 
-
0.068
* 
Constant 0.328 0.140 0.794** 
0.785
** 
0.943
* 
0.792 
0.855*
* 
0.957*
** 
1.036
** 
1.183
*** 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1554 1898 1862 1899 5630 10313 2426 2158 1904 1916 
adj. R-sq 0.100 0.103 0.106 0.125 0.198 0.226 0.146 0.146 0.121 0.136 
 
Table 13. Calendar-Time Approach - 36 Months Window 
This table presents results from the following three regressions of bidder long-run returns for a window of 36 
months following the acquisition announcement: 
                (       )      
                (       )                          
                (       )                                   
Where Rp,t is the value weighted monthly return of the calendar portfolio at month t, Rf is the monthly risk-
free rate of return, Rm,t is the monthly return on the market index at month t, SMBt is the monthly return on 
small minus large firms at month t, HMLt is the monthly return on high book-to-market minus low book-to-
market firms at month t and UMBy is the monthly return on previous 12-month return winners minus previous 
12-month loser firms at month t. βMkt,p, βSMB,p, βHML,p, βUMD,p are the regression parameters for each 
portfolio and εi is the error term. The intercept (α) measures the monthly average excess returns of acquiring 
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firms after controlling for the effect of the three risk factors. All factors have been obtained from Kenneth 
French’s website. 
Panel A present the results for the CAPM, Panel B for the 3 factor Fama-French model, Panel C for the 4 factor 
Carhart model and Panel D presents the raw return for each portfolio. The stockovervalued (stockundervalued) 
portfolio includes deals for which the transaction takes place 100% in equity and the bidder is classified as 
overvalued (undervalued) according to the Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) model. The cashovervalued 
(cashundervalued) portfolio includes deals for which the transaction takes place 100% in cash and the bidder is 
classified as overvalued (undervalued) according to the same model. Dif(SO-SU) captures the difference in 
monthly returns between stock overvalued and stock undervalued deals. Dif(CO-CU) captures the difference in 
monthly returns between cash overvalued and cash undervalued deals. The Dif-in-Difs captures the difference 
between the previous two differences [Dif(SO-SU)- Dif(CO-CU)]. 
All acquirers and targets are publicly traded firms listed on the major US markets. The superscripts ***, ** and 
* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. In all regressions, we control for 
year and industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by industry and year. N denotes the number of 
observations. 
 
Panel A: CAPM 
 
Stock 
Overvalued 
Stock 
Undervalued 
Dif(SO-
SU) 
Cash 
Overvalued 
Cash 
Undervalued 
Dif(CO-
CU) 
Dif-in-
Difs α -0.001 -0.005*** 0.003 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.005 
p-value (0.643) (0.004) (0.207) (0.527) (0.963) (0.558) (0.156) 
βMkt 1.298*** 0.989*** 0.311*** 1.145*** 0.944*** 0.202*** 0.115 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.114) 
N 380 391 379 391 395 391 379 
adj. R-sq 0.554 0.642 0.059 0.687 0.608 0.054 0.004 
 
Panel B: 3 factor Fama-French model 
 
Stock 
Overvalued 
Stock 
Undervalued 
Dif(SO-
SU) 
Cash 
Overvalued 
Cash 
Undervalued 
Dif(CO-
CU) 
Dif-in-
Difs α -0.001 -0.006*** 0.005* -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.006* 
p-value (0.620) (0.000) (0.067) (0.298) (0.537) (0.671) (0.075) 
βMkt 1.252*** 1.022*** 0.234*** 1.118*** 0.944*** 0.175*** 0.067 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.373) 
βSMB 0.356*** 0.268*** 0.088 0.428*** 0.321*** 0.107* -0.018 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.325) (0.000) (0.000) (0.084) (0.867) 
βHML 0.059 0.508*** -
0.460*** 
0.251*** 0.326*** -0.082 -
0.369*** p-value (0.525) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.218) (0.001) 
N 380 391 379 391 395 391 379 
adj. R-sq 0.571 0.716 0.120 0.734 0.655 0.063 0.027 
 
Panel C: 4 factor Carhart model 
 
Stock 
Overvalued 
Stock 
Undervalued 
Dif(SO-
SU) 
Cash 
Overvalued 
Cash 
Undervalued 
Dif(CO-
CU) 
Dif-in-
Difs α 0.000 -0.006*** 0.006** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006* 
p-value (0.918) (0.000) (0.030) (0.888) (0.976) (0.959) (0.078) 
βMkt 1.198*** 1.002*** 0.201*** 1.059*** 0.912*** 0.147*** 0.065 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.397) 
βSMB 0.368*** 0.272*** 0.095 0.439*** 0.327*** 0.112* -0.017 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.285) (0.000) (0.000) (0.069) (0.870) 
βHML -0.020 0.477*** -
0.509*** 
0.160*** 0.278*** -0.125* -
0.371*** p-value (0.827) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.067) (0.002) 
ΒUMD -0.207*** -0.082** -0.127** -0.239*** -0.128*** -
0.112*** 
-0.005 
p-value (0.000) (0.014) (0.037) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.944) 
N 380 391 379 391 395 391 379 
adj. R-sq 0.584 0.720 0.128 0.763 0.666 0.078 0.025 
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Panel D: Raw Returns 
 
Stock 
Overvalued 
Stock 
Undervalued 
Dif(SO-
SU) 
Cash 
Overvalued 
Cash 
Undervalued 
Dif(CO-
CU) 
Dif-in-
Difs Raw 
Returns 
0.008** 0.007*** 0.001 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.000 0.001 
p-value (0.040) (0.000) (0.781) (0.000) (0.000) (0.885) (0.838) 
 
